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ABSTRACT 
It is important to understand the impact that the proliferation of information 
displays has on the warfighter’s ability to reason about, or make sense of, 
battlefield information. This research investigates how information sources at a 
tactical operations center (TOC) workstation affected a battle captain’s ability to 
understand and portray ground truth in a simulated battlefield scenario. Twelve 
active-duty officers with previous battle-captain experience were randomly 
assigned to one of four groups. Each group was exposed once to each source 
condition (two or six sources) and tactical scenario. A replicated pre-network 
centric warfare (NCW) TOC workstation and modern digitally networked 
workstation were used for comparison. During each 40-minute battlefield 
scenario, participants provided situational reports (SITREPs), placed friendly and 
enemy unit symbols on the battlefield map, and provided perceived mental 
workload. The results of this research indicate that there is no difference for 
situational understanding between the modern battle captain workstation (six 
sources) and the legacy workstation (two sources), when the amount of 
information from the sources remains the same. Contrary to expectations, 
perceived mental workload using the two-source workstation is significantly 
higher than the six-source workstation. Results of this research could have 
implications for the design of future information system and networked 
workstations in TOCs.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Recent developments in satellite communications, global positioning system 
(GPS) technology, and information networking have revolutionized how 
battlefield information is shared, developing into a new military doctrine termed 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW). A battle captain’s workstation prior to the first 
Gulf War had two information sources—radio and telephone. Current 
workstations have between 6 and 10 information sources: radio, telephone, mirc 
chat (a form of instant messaging) with multiple chat windows, e-mail, FBCB2 
(Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below) moving map, and FBCB2 
messaging with multiple message areas. As NCW increases, both the 
information systems linked to the network and the amount of information flowing 
through it, tactical operations centers (TOCs) are adding more tactical displays. It 
is important to understand the impact that the proliferation of displays has on the 
warfighter’s ability to reason about, or make sense of, battlefield information. This 
research investigates how information sources at a TOC workstation affect a 
battle captain’s ability to understand and portray ground truth in a simulated 
battlefield scenario. 
During this research, a laboratory experiment was conducted to assess 
battle captain sense-making ability while monitoring a simulated battlefield 
scenario. This research used a 2 x 2 crossover design, comparing the number of 
sources (two-source and six-source) in two similar tactical scenarios. Twelve 
active duty Army and Marine Corps officers, with previous battle captain 
experience, were randomly assigned to one of four groups. Each group was 
exposed once to each source condition (two or six sources) and tactical scenario. 
The two-source condition replicated a pre-NCW TOC workstation, while the six-
source condition replicated the current networked workstation. During the 
40-minute battlefield scenario, participants were required to provide situational 
reports (SITREPs) approximately every 10 minutes, place friendly and enemy 
 
 xviii 
unit symbols on the battlefield map where they believed them to be located at the 
end of the scenario, and provide their perceived mental workload every five 
minutes during each trial. 
During the course of this research effort, we found that when a fixed 
amount of information was presented to a battle captain by a differing number of 
sources (two and six), the impact on situational understanding was insignificant. 
Contrary to expectations, the perceived mental workload that battle captains 
experienced while tracking a simulated battlefield situation was significantly 
higher for the two-source (analog and legacy) condition than for the six-source 
(current and digital) condition. Posthoc analysis to determine the influence of 
initial training and experience on a battle captain’s situational understanding and 
perceived mental workload concluded that digital command and control 
experience (digital native versus digital immigrant) was not a significant predictor 
of either situational understanding or mental workload. 
Results of this research could have implications for the design of future 
information systems and networked workstations in TOCs. Simply adding an 
information source to a TOC workstation may not have the effect of increased 
situational understanding. All information sources located at each workstation 
must be reviewed while accounting for information flow rates, presentation 
methods, type of information, and attention resources required to properly 
perceive the information. 
 xix 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The digital and information age has modernized the way wars are fought 
and won. General Eric Shinseki, 34th U.S. Army Chief of Staff, presented his 
vision of Army transformation in 1999, during the 45th annual meeting of the 
Association of the United States Army (Gilmore, 1999). Part of his long-term, 
strategic plan envisioned network-centric combat teams, linked through 
integrated digital systems, capable of producing a shared, digital common 
operating picture (COP). This vision set the United States Army on a new path of 
innovation and technological development that continues today. Shinseki’s 
vision, coupled with recent developments in satellite communications, global 
positioning system (GPS) technology, and information networking have 
revolutionized how battlefield information is shared throughout the Army. 
Initial development of integrated, digital command and control (C2) 
information systems (INFOSYS) produced the Army Battle Command System 
(ABCS) (see Figure 1). Consisting of several C2 systems, ABCS integrates 
digital systems from strategic to tactical levels, while managing battlefield 
information across warfighting functions. Operational- and tactical-level 
personnel interact with ABCS through Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and 
Below (FBCB2) and Command Post of the Future (CPOF) terminals, located in 
Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) and commanders’ vehicles on the battlefield. 
FBCB2 and CPOF terminals provide superiors, peers, and subordinates with the 
ability to interact and collaborate in real time, while monitoring up-to-date, 
integrated, battlefield information. The presence of integrated digital systems, in 
both TOCs and operational commanders’ vehicles, provides the means for 
creating the digital COP that General Shinseki envisioned. To cope with the 
increased speed of military operations enabled by the information advantage 
from networked C2 systems, the Department of Defense (DoD) pioneered a new 
military doctrine termed Network Centric Warfare (NCW). 
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Figure 1.   Army Battle Command System  
(From: Department of the Army, 2003) 
As NCW continues to develop, the supply of detailed, real-time, and 
accurate battlespace information presented to commanders and their staffs will 
increase (Thunholm, 2008). Department of the Army’s Mission Command Field 
Manual (FM) 6-0 (2003) claims that increasing digitization and information 
systems will increase the capacity of commanders and their staffs to share 
information, thus improving their understanding of the battlefield. However, 
increasing the size of the network creates additional information sources, which 
increase the amount of information TOC staffs must monitor for relevant 
information to include in their sensemaking process, which is discussed in detail 
in Chapter II. 
A common myth is that more information leads to better understanding or 
sensemaking (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006a). Klein, Moon, and Hoffman 
(2006b) define sensemaking as the process of making a mental model, where 
mental models are representations that explain the unfolding events, not isolated 
stimuli. It is well established that an individual may become overwhelmed with 
information (Oskamp, 1965; O’Reilly, 1980), thereby degrading a person’s 
decision-making performance. If a staff member, such as a TOC battle captain, 
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becomes overwhelmed with information presented from the information sources 
at their workstation, their sensemaking ability degrades. A battle captain is the 
individual in the TOC responsible for coordinating, planning, resourcing, and 
battle tracking all units task organized under that command. When sensemaking 
degrades, the battle captain’s situational understanding is reduced and their 
mental model of battlefield ground truth becomes skewed. 
Prior to the first Gulf War, a battle captain’s workstation had two 
information sources—radio and telephone. Current workstations have between 6 
and 10 information sources: radio, telephone, mirc chat (a form of instant 
messaging) with multiple chat windows, e-mail, FBCB2 moving map, and FBCB2 
messaging with multiple message areas. In contrast to Oskamp (1965) and 
O’Reilly (1980), it is not known whether sensemaking would be adversely 
affected if, rather than being inundated with too much information, a manageable 
amount of information from a few sources is distributed across many more 
sources. How does this distribution of information influence the ability to 
determine what is relevant and irrelevant? 
As NCW increases both the information systems linked to the network and 
the amount of information flowing through it, TOCs are adding many more 
tactical displays. It is important that we understand the impact of this proliferation 
of displays on situational understanding. Currently, there is no empirically derived 
guidance to indicate the number of information systems or sources that an 
individual operator can attend to at a TOC workstation without degrading the 
warfighter’s situational understanding. Therefore, this research will investigate 
the impact of the number of information sources in a TOC on the warfighter’s 
ability to reason about, or make sense of, the battlefield. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This study investigated how changing the number of information sources 
at a TOC workstation affected a battle captain’s ability to understand and 
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accurately portray ground truth in a simulated battlefield scenario. The specific 
objectives of this research effort are: 
• Analyzing the accuracy of a battle captain’s situational 
understanding as information sources at a simulated TOC 
workstation under two conditions: from a pre-Gulf War TOC with 
two displays and a current, digital age TOC with six or more 
displays 
• Analyzing the accuracy of map tracking in different information 
source conditions with respect to battlefield ground truth 
• Assessing how the number of information sources influences a 
battle captain’s self-reported workload 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The specific research questions addressed by this study are: 
• Does the number of sources providing information to a battle 
captain influence his or her ability to accurately make sense of 
battlefield reports? 
• Is the accuracy of a battle captain’s portrayal of ground truth 
associated with the number of information sources providing him or 
her information? 
• Does adding sources of information increase perceived individual 
workload? 
D. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) 
The U.S. Army was the first multidimensional organization to fully 
implement and demonstrate the benefits of an HSI approach, by concentrating 
on the human element (Booher, 2003). This effort started in 1986, when the 
Army created the Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) office, 
which focused on improving weapons systems and unit performance. By 
changing the emphasis of weapons system development away from an 
equipment-only perspective, Army leaders embraced the total system view of 
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design that includes human performance characteristics, along with equipment 
performance requirements. This change within the Army acquisition life cycle 
brought together seven fundamental domains of human and system functionality 
not previously considered together during system design. While the Navy and  
Air Force also consider habitability a domain (Air Force 711 Human Performance 
Wing, 2008; Department of the Navy [OPNAV], 1996), the Army focuses on the 
following seven domains to guide total system design (Manpower and Personnel 
Integration [MANPRINT], 2005): 
• Manpower 
• Personnel Capabilities 
• Training 
• Human Factors Engineering 
• System Safety 
• Health Hazards 
• Soldier Survivability 
Select HSI domains are considered during system design, depending on 
the scope of the project. Every MANPRINT domain has unique costs associated 
with potential savings when considered during system design. The trade-off 
associated with each domain creates a “trade space,” which is considered the 
range between objective and threshold values for required system attributes 
(MANPRINT, 2005). Domain trade-offs are at the core of HSI analysis. Balancing 
human and system requirements within the trade space for system performance 
creates a balance among system cost, acquisition schedule, and system 
performance parameters (MANPRINT, 2005). This research focuses on three of 
the seven HSI domains: human factors engineering, personnel capabilities,  
and manpower. 
Human Factors Engineering (HFE): The goal of HFE within HSI is to 
maximize the ability of an individual or crew to operate and maintain a system at 
required levels by eliminating design-induced difficulty and error. Human factors 
engineers work with systems engineers to design and evaluate human-system 
 6 
interfaces to ensure they are compatible with the capabilities and limitations of 
the potential user population (MANPRINT, 2005; Air Force 711 Human 
Performance Wing, 2008). 
Due to the rate of digital system integration into the TOC environment, 
system designs must account for human limitations. As the availability of digital 
information to decision makers increases, there is a serious risk that 
commanders and their staffs will become overwhelmed with information. Future 
C2 systems must consider the impact of an increase of information sources on 
an individual’s ability to make sense of the battlefield and, ultimately, understand 
ground truth. This thesis will provide insight into the number of information 
sources that an individual can monitor without degrading their ability to rapidly 
and accurately make sense of battlefield information. 
Personnel: The personnel domain addresses the requisite cognitive and 
physical characteristics necessary for warfighters to be successful in their military 
occupational specialty (MOS). Personnel capabilities are normally reflected as 
knowledge, skills, abilities, and other characteristics (KSAOs) (MANPRINT, 2005; 
Air Force 711 Human Performance Wing, 2008). The Army attempts to ensure 
that a unit’s staff has the right mix of experience, knowledge, and training. This 
balance ensures that the commander has the human resources required to 
interpret and respond to the battlefield situation. 
One personnel characteristic discussed in this thesis is working memory. 
Specifically, how does an individual’s working memory capacity affect their ability 
to develop an accurate understanding of ground truth as the number of 
information sources increases? The research literature (McKendrick et al., 2011; 
Yeh & Wickens, 1988) suggests that individuals with a higher capacity for 
working memory should be able to develop a deeper and more accurate 
understanding of a situation when multiple sources or variables are involved. 
Manpower: This domain addresses the number of military and civilian 
personnel required and potentially available to operate, maintain, sustain, and 
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provide training for systems. Essentially, manpower addresses the number of 
personnel spaces (authorized positions) and available people (operating 
strength) (MANPRINT, 2005; Air Force 711 Human Performance Wing, 2008). 
The manpower available for units to adequately staff the TOC information 
systems should be confined to the personnel currently serving in staff positions. 
However, many units regularly reassign Officers or Noncommissioned Officers 
(NCOs) from subordinate units to fill TOC manning gaps during deployments so 
that all systems have someone to monitor them. As discussed by Rhodes and 
Minami (2007), when digital systems are added to a TOC, more people are 
required to operate and monitor them. When information sources are added to a 
TOC without increasing personnel, there is a risk of increasing an operator’s 
workload beyond capacity. By investigating an individual’s ability to make sense 
of the battlefield, this thesis will help determine optimal manning and personnel 
requirements for digitized C2 centers of the future by gaining a better 
understanding of how information sources impact individual workload, which 
influences the sensemaking process and, ultimately, situational understanding. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter II reviews literature 
regarding the evolution of information systems, the benefits and challenges of 
NCW, applicable theories and information models, TOC organization, and 
decision making. Chapter III outlines the methods used to conduct the 
experiment and describes the research design and process. Chapter IV reports 
the results of the experiment, while Chapter V discusses the findings and 
conclusions, as well as recommendations for follow-on research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Evolution of Information Systems in Command and Control 
(C2) 
The information revolution in progress is all about the amount of 
information richness and reach, and the quality of interactions 
between and among entities that are possible as a result of 
advances in technology. (Alberts & Hayes, 2003, p. 74) 
Developing and exploiting an information advantage over the enemy has 
always been important for success in military operations. Methods of military C2 
have progressed with technology over time, resulting in information system 
innovations that fundamentally change the way in which commanders interact 
with and control units on the battlefield. Such innovations include horseback 
couriers, signal flags, telegraph, wireless radio, and satellite communications 
(Office of Force Transformation, 2005). These innovations offer an opportunity to 
reduce the fog and friction in war, referred to by Carl von Clausewitz 
(Translated/Edited version, 1976) as early as 1830, by providing field 
commanders with more timely and accurate information—that is, by accelerating 
the sensemaking process. 
Timely and accurate information reduces a commander’s sensemaking 
cycle, previously referred to as Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) 
Loop (Brehmer, 2005) (see Figure 2). A sensemaking cycle refers to the 
continual process in which a commander utilizes information from the cognitive, 
information, and physical domains to reach and implement decisions. Each of the 
earlier innovations reduced message transmission time and compressed 
distances, allowing battlefield information (physical domain) to enter into the 
commander’s cognitive domain sooner. This enables a decision to be 
communicated to frontline commanders and implemented into the physical 
domain in a shorter period. As the pace of warfare increases and information 
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systems evolve, the commander’s sensemaking cycles must become faster, 
while incorporating more information from each domain. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Traditional View of C2: OODA Loop (From: Alberts et al., 2001) 
The computer age continues to facilitate advancements in military 
communication systems through the integration of networks. While past 
communication innovations reduced the time required to complete a 
sensemaking cycle, networked systems have produced truly revolutionary 
changes in C2 (Rhodes & Minami, 2007). Today, many systems—from those 
worn by the individual Soldier, to our most complex aircraft and ground combat 
vehicles—incorporate networked information technology in order to leverage 
real-time battlefield information. This integration vastly increases the ability to 
collect, process, disseminate, and utilize information (Alberts, Garstka, & Stein, 
2000). As a result, military doctrine and C2 processes have been updated to 
account for new system designs that improve the flow of battlefield information. 
Networked digital systems first appeared in ground combat vehicles and 
Brigade-level TOCs in 1996, during an advanced warfighting experiment (AWE) 
(General Accounting Office, 1998). The resounding success of the experiment 
led to the development and implementation of networked C2 functions in Army 
combat systems. Today, information and decisions travel instantaneously to 
where they are needed, making the exact location of the recipients largely 
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irrelevant (Alberts et al., 2000). This technological advancement increases the 
speed of decision making even more. The traditional sensemaking cycle, which 
incorporates the cognitive, information, and physical domains (see Figure 2), is 
replaced with a more integrated process completely supported by the information 
network (see Figure 3). As a result, the DoD pioneered a new military doctrine 
called Network Centric Warfare. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Anticipated Network Integration (From: Alberts et al., 2001) 
2. Benefits and Challenges of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
Alberts, Garstka, and Stein (2000) define NCW as: 
An information superiority-enabled concept of operations that 
generates increased combat power by networking sensors, 
decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, 
increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater 
lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-
synchronization. In essence, NCW translates information 
superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable 
entities in the battlespace. (p. 2) 
NCW, also called network-centric operations, is a change from the 
traditional way of thinking about military operations. It focuses on combat power 
generated by linking or networking the warfighting enterprise (Alberts et al., 
2000). Network nodes are network connection points for information transfer 
capable of sending, receiving, or forwarding information over the network. The 
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term “time lag” (the time delay between information input and information receipt) 
refers to network lag. The power of NCW is the linking and networking of 
geographically or hierarchically dispersed nodes and the shortening of lags in the 
transfer of information. 
Nodes may have different forms: TOC workstation, airborne C2 platform, 
ground combat vehicle, Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), networked sensor, or 
individual Soldier, to name a few. Each node contributes to, or makes sense of, 
information on the network. As the number of nodes increases, the effectiveness 
of collaboration and shared information should also increase. This relationship is 
characterized by Metcalfe’s Law, which states that as the number of nodes in a 
network increases linearly, the potential value or effectiveness of the network 
increases exponentially as the square number of nodes in the network (see 
Figure 4) (Alberts et al., 2000). Thus, increasing the nodes linked to the network 
should create significant operational benefits across the force. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Metcalfe’s Law (From: Alberts et al., 2000) 
Alberts et al. (2000) argue that NCW enables collaborators to achieve 
shared awareness and synchronization across time and space. The C2 network 
increases operational tempo by reducing commanders’ sensemaking cycles, 
allowing them to decide and act faster than the enemy by improving 
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collaboration. The benefits of networking for combat maneuver units include 
increased planning speed, calls for fire, force lethality, and improved mission 
outcomes. Inferred improvements include improvements in information quality, 
information sharing, situational awareness, shared awareness, collaboration, and 
synchronization (see Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5.   NCW Benefits for Maneuver Units (From: Alberts et al., 2001) 
Though the benefits of NCW are numerous, challenges from internal and 
external factors are present. Internal network factors produce the risk of 
information overload, difficulty determining relevant from irrelevant information, 
and commander micromanagement (Wallace, 2005). These internal factors are 
addressable through proper training of personnel interacting with the network, 
and system design accounting for human information processing limitations. 
External factors threatening the success of NCW include network design and 
training, as well as the network-centric C2 capabilities of our enemies. 
As our enemies develop C2 networking capability, the military advantage 
will go to those best able to rapidly change organizational structures, create new 
doctrine, and assimilate new technologies in less time (Office of Force 
Transformation, 2005), thereby gaining information superiority. Information 
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superiority in military operations is a state derived from the ability to exploit a 
superior information position (Alberts et al., 2000). Alberts et al. believe that in 
order to gain and maintain the dominant information position, future C2 networks 
must convey more accurate and more relevant information in less time than the 
enemy or competitor (see Figure 6). Absent from this assessment is the human 
factor that accounts for the input of relevant and accurate information onto the 




Figure 6.   Superior Information Position (From: Alberts et al., 2000) 
3. Sensemaking 
A knowledge management workshop sponsored by the Command and 
Control Research Program (CCRP) identified sensemaking as an essential 
cognitive element of the military decision-making process (MDMP) (Leedom, 
2001). Jensen and Brehmer (2005) state that sensemaking is a central task in 
military decision making and in the collective work of a military staff. While 
military commanders and their staffs have always engaged in “making sense” of 
Mission, Enemy, Terrain available, Troops, Time, and Civilian Considerations 
(METT-TC), there exists a heightened requirement for addressing this process 
and its contribution to effective C2 (Leedom, 2001). As military doctrine 
associated with NCW develops, the military requires a deeper understanding of 
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how sensemaking occurs at both the individual and organizational levels within a 
C2 system, as well as how sensemaking is shaped by information technology, 
battle staff training, and organizational design (Leedom, 2001). 
Jensen and Brehmer (2005) state that sensemaking is the process of 
achieving an understanding of the situation in terms of what to do. Klein et al. 
(2006b) expand this view by adding that sensemaking is the process of making a 
mental model, where mental models are representations that explain unfolding 
events, not isolated stimuli. Similar to Klein et al. (2006b), Endsley (1995) 
discusses integrating information (situational comprehension) by using mental 
models and frames to solve problems. However, Jensen and Brehmer (2005) 
and Klein et al. (2006b) refer to sensemaking as a process for improving 
situational understanding with both retrospective analysis and future projection, 
whereas Endsley employs mental models and frames to reach an improved state 
within situational awareness to aid problem solving. This author concurs with 
Jensen and Brehmer (2005) and Klein et al. (2006b) that sensemaking is a 
continuous process, and further agrees with Klein et al.’s representation of the 
sensemaking process depicted in the data/frame theory. 
In their data/frame theory (see Figure 7), Klein et al. (2006b) use the term 
“frame” to describe an individual’s perspective or viewpoint, or a mental 
framework already possessed by the individual. They state that frames define 
what counts as data and actually shape the data themselves. The current frame, 
which each individual uniquely possesses in every situation, constitutes his or 
her determination of information relevance. This creates instances where frames 
shape and define information relevance, and information mandates that frames 
change in nontrivial ways (Klein et al., 2006b). They go on to describe an 
iterative sensemaking process that consists of closed loop transitions between 
mental model formation and mental simulation. The basic sensemaking act 
elaborates frames with detail and questions the explanations they provide in 
order to achieve a “data-frame symbiosis” (Klein et al., 2006b, p. 88). 
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Figure 7.   Data/Frame Theory of Sensemaking (From: Klein et al., 2006b) 
The data/frame theory of the sensemaking process describes the 
continuously changing state of situational understanding. In military situations, 
the constantly changing state of understanding drives a commander’s  
decision-making process. When applied to the decision-making process within a 
military TOC, the data/frame theory also describes how a battle captain builds an 
understanding of battlefield events from abbreviated reports provided by 
subordinates and adjacent units, as well as information available on the network. 
The battle captain must assess a constant flow of information, from multiple 
sources, for relevancy, using his or her current mental model or frame. As digital 
C2 systems increase the amount of information available to battle captains, it is 
important to understand the link between sensemaking ability and the number of 
information sources that an individual can monitor before situational 
understanding degrades. 
4. Applicable Theories and Information Models 
Human operators decipher and make sense of a significant amount of 
information within C2 networks. Of the three factors required for information 
dominance listed by Alberts et al. (2000), human interaction significantly 
influences two: information relevance and information accuracy. Information 
 17 
relevance is a dynamic attribute, which makes it challenging to measure (Alberts 
et al., 2001). There is no correct or absolute answer as to what constitutes 
relevant information. Personal experience, education, training, and perspective 
are tools used to determine information relevance in every battlefield situation 
(Alberts et al., 2001). Warfighters must also consider the accuracy of information 
on the network throughout their sensemaking process. Although seemingly 
straightforward, information accuracy is not always known with certainty. 
Relevant information is weighed and judged to determine accuracy during the 
sensemaking process. For example, two individuals observe the same battlefield 
event, but submit different accounts to the network. Though each report is 
completely accurate from the individual point of view, a battle captain must make 
sense of the discrepancy to determine ground truth. As network nodes increase 
and raw reports conflict, a significant amount of time may be spent determining 
information accuracy and relevance. Therefore, we require a more thorough 
understanding of how network factors and design influence an individual’s 
sensemaking process when reasoning about information on the network. There 
are several theories and concepts that provide insight into how individuals attend 
to and make sense of information over time. 
a. Workload and Multiple Resource Theory (MRT) 
As networks continue to grow in size and scope, the amount of 
information available to system operators also increases. Both the amount of 
information presented to the operator and the manner in which it is presented 
influences workload. Kramer, Sirevaag, and Braune (1987) define workload as 
the cost of performing a task in terms of a reduction in the capacity to perform 
additional tasks that use the same processing resource. Sarno and Wickens 
(1995) simplify the definition by describing workload as the relationship between 
resource supply and task demand. When demand for mental resources exceeds 




& Wickens, 2003). MRT contributes to understanding mental workload and 
performance degradation, but only when overload is imposed on the system 
operator (Wickens, 2008). 
MRT was developed, in part, to explain a human operator’s 
performance in high workload, multitask environments (Wickens, 2002), and is 
not a theory of attention or workload, though workload is closely related. The 
distinct difference between workload and MRT is that workload relates more to 
performance potential in high-demand situations, where multiple resources are 
capacities used that are directly related to actual performance observed 
(Wickens, 2002). MRT best describes situations where an overloaded individual 
is required to perform multiple tasks simultaneously across different resources, 
similar to TOC operators in emergency situations. Wickens (2002) uses the 
graph in Figure 8 to depict the perceptual modalities (senses), stages 
(perceptual, cognitive, and response), visual channels (focal and ambient), and 
processing codes (analogue/spatial and categorical/symbolic) used by an 
individual when processing information. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Multiple Resource Model (From: Wickens, 2002) 
The model predicts disruption between two or more time-shared 
tasks. When used as a guide, MRT helps system designers develop controls, 
input methods, and create displays that reduce or limit resource interference. As 
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digital networks evolve, leveraging MRT principles can increase productivity and 
performance for system operators. However, incorrectly designed systems not 
adhering to MRT principles could overtax modalities, cause conflict, and thus 
diminish the effectiveness of the overall system due to reduced operator 
performance. 
Wickens’ (2002) model and subsequent research (Dixon & 
Wickens, 2003) suggests that individuals will process multiple information items 
sequentially if the items use the same resource, or in parallel if they require 
different resources. Digital C2 systems currently integrated in U.S. Army TOCs 
rely heavily on the visual and auditory modalities. Reports and information 
presented on multiple computer screens, UAS feeds displaying real-time 
battlefield images, wall charts updated by other TOC personnel, and TOC 
personnel themselves all compete for a warfighter’s visual resources. The 
auditory modality experiences the same competition. Battlefield radio reports, 
orders or commands issued in the TOC, and auditory cues integrated into digital 
reporting systems all compete for an individual’s auditory modality. MRT supports 
parallel processing of visual and auditory information; however, information within 
the same channel or modality is processed in sequence. TOC operators 
overwhelmed with information may be unable to successfully process everything 
due to bottlenecks (Broadbent, 1971; Welford, 1967) within individual resources. 
The prediction of MRT is that operators will miss, disregard, or simply choose not 
to attend to certain information sources in order to cope with a high volume of 
information. In this situation, TOC operators are experiencing information 
overload. Presenting information in a manner that reduces information channel 
and resource overload increases information processing and reduces  
information overload. 
b. Information Overload 
 Decision makers tend to seek more information than they require 
(Driver & Mock, 1975; Schroder, Driver, & Steufert, 1967), leading to information 
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overload and reduced decision-making accuracy. Information overload can mean 
several things, such as having more relevant information than one can assimilate 
(Edmunds & Morris, 2000), or being burdened with a large supply of unsolicited 
information, some of which may be relevant (Butcher, 1998). Klapp (1986) states 
that information presented at a rate too high for a receiver to efficiently process 
without distraction, stress, increasing errors, and other costs acts as noise, 
making it more difficult to determine relevant from irrelevant information. 
As stated previously, military organizations able to achieve 
information superiority have a significant advantage over their competitors. Lewis 
(1996) acknowledges this fact when stating that professional and personal 
survival in modern society clearly depends on our ability to take on board vast 
amounts of new information. Yet, unless that information can be filtered for 
relevant information and applied to the COP to achieve a new understanding 
closer to that of ground truth, the ability to receive vast amounts of information 
does not improve sensemaking in a military C2 environment. O’Reilly (1980) calls 
attention to the need to match decision makers’ information-processing capacity 
to the information load encountered. Oskamp (1965) found that with increasing 
information, a decision maker’s performance degrades; yet their decision 
confidence increases. This finding suggests that as decision makers delay in 
order to gather more information, their sensemaking may actually degrade. The 
trade-off here is between making decisions quickly, based on potentially 
inadequate information, and waiting too long and developing an inaccurate 
picture of ground truth by mistakenly including information that is irrelevant. 
 Information overload is akin to workload in that both are related to 
performance potential in high-demand situations. System operators who  
self-report low workload indicate they still have information processing capacity in 
reserve and are not experiencing information overload. The precise amount of 
information required to induce information overload, thus reducing  
decision-making performance, changes with each situation and every individual. 
Of interest to the present research is the impact that the number of information 
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sources has on an individual’s self-reported workload and the impact that those 
information sources have on information overload. 
c. Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (DMSC) 
The DMSC (see Figure 9) (Shattuck & Miller, 2006) illustrates the 
flow of data from technological systems to an individual decision maker and 
describes the process by which the decision maker reasons (i.e., perceives, 
comprehends, and projects) about the battlefield. The DMSC consists of a series 
of ovals and lenses. The ovals depict information about the environment, with 
Oval 1 containing all data in the environment, or ground truth. Oval 2 consists of 
data elements accurately detected by sensors, while Oval 3 depicts the data 
displayed or presented to an operator or battle captain. There are also three 
lenses within the DMSC that influence how information is processed or 
interpreted by an operator. These lenses represent individual operator biases or 
differences that influence interpretation of the environmental information 
presented by information sources. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (From: Shattuck & Miller, 
2006) 
The goals of sensemaking and the DMSC are similar in their 
attempt to comprehend and make sense of events. The data/frame theory (Klein 
et al., 2006b) (see Figure 7) explains the cognitive processes within the DMSC 
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as information propagates through Ovals 4, 5, and 6. Comprehension and 
sensemaking of battlefield events may stray from ground truth as an individual 
adjusts his or her mental frame or the data contained within it. In order to ensure 
decision makers perceive the correct data, comprehend it accurately, and 
sensemake appropriately, we must improve our understanding of how 
technological systems influence the sensemaking process. 
Shattuck and Miller (2006) explain that distortions in the lens could 
result in inaccurate perceptions (Oval 4). While the three lenses in the DMSC 
originally consisted of only the local situation, the military operations order 
(OPORD), military doctrine, and the experience of the operator (Miller & 
Shattuck, 2004), they have since been updated. They now include individual 
traits (e.g., intellect or personality) and temporary states (e.g., fatigue or fear) 
(Shattuck & Miller, 2006). The model does not specifically account for information 
presentation methods or information sources as having an impact on the user’s 
perception; the lenses are what direct the decision maker’s attention. 
Today, networked C2 workstations consist of numerous information 
sources, all presenting a constant stream of information to the user. Individual 
factors such as familiarization with individual networked systems, level of training 
received, or personal preference may also influence perception. Understanding 
how familiarity with network systems, or digital workspace interaction, influences 
individual perception in a military C2 environment is critical to ensure that the 
United States is able to maintain information superiority in the future. 
d. Situational Awareness (SA) 
 The most widely cited definition of SA is Endsley’s (1995)  
human-centric interpretation: “perception of elements in the environment within a 
volume of time and space (level 1), the comprehension of their meaning (level 2), 
and the projection of their status in the near future (level-3)” (p. 36) (see  
Figure 10). Level two of Endsley’s model, titled “comprehension of current 
situation,” is equivalent to understanding the current situation. Endsley (1995) 
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further defines SA “as a state of knowledge, developed from the processes used 
to achieve that state” (p. 36). The processes Endsley (1995) refers to are those 
used by individuals to achieve, acquire, or maintain SA. 
 
 
Figure 10.   Endsley’s Model of SA (From: Endsley, 1995) 
According to the Mission Command Field Manual (FM 6-0) 
(Department of the Army, 2003), by applying judgment to the COP, commanders 
achieve situational understanding and make decisions (this relationship is 
presented in Figure 11). The U.S. Army officially defines SA as “the immediate 
knowledge of the conditions of the operation, constrained geographically and in 
time” (Department of the Army, 2008, p. 7-11). The Operations Field Manual (FM 
3-0) defines situational understanding as the “product of applying analysis and 
judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships among the 




Figure 11.   Developing Situational Understanding  
(From: Department of the Army, 2003) 
Therefore, situational understanding can be thought of as the 
process used for decision making, by using relevant information to determine the 
implications of what is happening and what may happen with respect to ground 
truth, while SA is the product or current state of understanding battlefield 
relationships. The sensemaking process, using mental models and mental 
simulation, continually adjusts an individual’s frame for determining information 
relevancy that plausibly links events over time, creating an understanding of the 
situation that ultimately enables rational decisions, based on an understanding of 
ground truth. 
e. Sensemaking and Situational Awareness (SA) 
The objective of the present research effort is to determine how 
information sources influence an individual’s sensemaking (i.e., the knowledge 
and understanding of the current situation). By applying relevant information to 
the COP using a sensemaking process, a battle captain improves situational 
understanding with respect to ground truth. This review of the relevant literature 
suggests that decisions are made and weighed against the current 
understanding of the situation arrived at through a continuous sensemaking 
process. Every battle captain begins the process with an initial frame or 
perspective of what ground truth is, creating an initial situational understanding 
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from which decisions are based. Ground truth, however, is a moving target that 
continuously changes as friendly and enemy units maneuver and engage each 
other on the battlefield. The manner in which the battle captain is presented, 
attends to, and processes information from workstation interfaces during 
sensemaking influences the process itself. The battle captain determines 
information relevancy based on his or her current frame, which continually 
updates and changes as information is added to the frame, or the frame changes 
based on new information. Including relevant information to the battle captain’s 
frame during the sensemaking process should reduce the gap between 
situational understanding and ground truth. Battlefield decisions are not made 
with a complete understanding of ground truth; they are made with an imperfect 
understanding of the situation created by the sensemaking process. This 
continuous individual sensemaking process is the focus of this thesis; however, 
the influence of the TOC staff on battle captain sensemaking has not yet  
been discussed. 
Jensen and Brehmer (2005) developed a sensemaking process 
model representing the process of how battle captains and staffs interact with the 
real world and new information. Much of their effort focused on shared 
awareness and the group sensemaking process, seen in their model of 
sensemaking in military decision making (see Figure 12). Though they recognize 
that every staff member develops an individual view of the situation, it is the 
interaction and exchange of these views that creates a shared sense among a 
military staff. Jensen and Brehmer (2005) state that situational assessment and 
SA are not components in the sensemaking process, claiming that sensemaking 
has different roots and represents a different view of human cognitive processes 
than SA. This view is not fully consistent with the relationship previously stated in 




Figure 12.   The Model of Sensemaking in Military Decision Making  
(From: Jensen & Brehmer, 2005) 
The author believes that sensemaking is the most important 
component of situational understanding, characterized by the continuous 
synthesis of disjointed information; battle captains make a “motivated effort to 
understand connections in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” 
(Klein et al., 2006b, p. 88). The goal of sensemaking is not to achieve a state or 
level as SA does, but strives to continuously improve individual or group 
situational understanding, given past events and current future projections with 
respect to ground truth. A battle captain or collective staff cannot perceive all 
battlefield information characterizing ground truth during an ongoing operation. 
Only through detailed retrospective analysis of the situation can a battle captain’s 
or staff’s complete understanding of the situation be determined; this “state” of 
knowledge is SA at that particular point in time. Wickens, Gordon, and Liu’s 
(1998) information-processing model describes the method in which individuals 
receive information from the environment and act on it to improve situational 
understanding. 
Elements from the models of information processing, SA, and 
sensemaking can be combined into a holistic, conceptual model that may 
describe the sensemaking process more accurately and completely. Endsley’s 
mechanisms of SA diagram (Endsley, 1995), attempts to combine Wickens’ 
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information-processing model with her model of SA. It is this author’s belief that 
SA should not be applied to the information-processing model related to decision 
making because it is characterized as a state of knowledge captured through 
retrospective analysis and not an active, forward-projecting process. Building on 
Wickens’ information-processing model and the decision-making and action 
guidance elements from Endsley’s mechanisms of SA model, this thesis 
proposes a new model (see Figure 13), which depicts Klein et al.’s data/frame 
sensemaking process as the main component that improves situational 
understanding, linked to decision making and action guidance. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Information Process Model with Sensemaking 
Starting at the left side of Figure 13, the information-processing 
model shows how sensory information is received from the environment by 
individual senses, perceived by an individual, and given meaning through 
interaction with long-term and working memory. Individuals (e.g., battle captains) 
decide to act or not act on the information, by selecting an appropriate response. 
The author replaces Wickens’ “thought decision making” (Wickens et al., 1998,  
p. 147) block in his original information-processing diagram with the data/frame 
sensemaking process from Klein et al. (2006b) supporting situational 
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understanding. The attention provided to each of the main processes is one of 
the four forms of attention (selective, directed, distraction, or divided) discussed 
by Wickens et al. (1998). This proposed model informs Wickens’ information-
processing model by providing further insight into the manner in which perceived 
information is understood and influences decision making. 
In the context of the TOC, a battle captain perceives sensory 
information and includes it in his or her sensemaking process. The battle captain 
determines information relevance during the sensemaking process, while 
information accuracy is also judged, and decisions are made about whether to 
include this information as data in the current frame or adjust the frames as 
required, thus improving the battle captain’s situational understanding with 
respect to battlefield ground truth. Situational understanding influences the battle 
captain’s decision making, whether it is a decision requiring action or a decision 
to not act or present recommendations to the commander. The sensemaking 
process generates mental models of the current and future situation based on 
information from the past and his or her current understanding. 
B. BATTLE CAPTAIN WORKSTATION 
1. Battle Captain Workstation Versus Entire Tactical Operations 
Center (TOC) 
A recent study by Rhodes and Minami (2007) found that since the 
beginning of the digital C2 shift in the late 1990s, the size of the TOC, the 
amount of communications and computer equipment, as well as the number of 
personnel needed to operate this equipment has increased. They also observed 
that greater amounts and increased types of information are transferred between 
TOCs, placing greater requirements on the flow of accurate information (Rhodes 
& Minami, 2007). 
Adding information systems or network nodes to a TOC increases the 
number of personnel required to operate them, creating additional levels to which 
information must be transferred. This not only adds manpower, but also levels of 
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bureaucracy or command, thereby slowing information flow as it gets to staff 
members tasked with determining the relevance of the information to the current 
situation. This is counter to the goal of flattening the process and eliminating 
information stovepipes. 
System designers and programmers add information systems to 
warfighters’ workstations, thus increasing the number of information sources 
available to a single operator. Operators should benefit from access to additional 
sources of information; however, every system added to an individual’s 
workstation becomes another information source that requires monitoring, 
assessing, and incorporating into the sensemaking cycle. 
Currently, there is no doctrinally approved technique for establishing a 
TOC configuration (Battle Command Training Center, 2006). Thus, there is no 
doctrinally approved technique for determining what information systems or 
network nodes must be located at particular workstations. TOC architectures 
vary depending on each unit commander’s preference, the type of organization 
and mission, and equipment available (Rhodes & Minami, 2007). No matter what 
configuration is implemented, the following common factors influence the 
effectiveness of the TOC (Battle Command Training Center, 2006): 
• a high degree of organization; 
• configured in a manner that facilitates functionality and precludes 
segregated staff sections; and 
• planning areas segregated from briefing and operational areas. 
A dedicated and deliberate process for managing information and 
information flow within a TOC must be developed to ensure that individuals who 
require the information actually obtain it. A sample message flow diagram 
highlights the importance of the battle captain in the flow of TOC information (see 
Figure 14). The battle captain is the primary link to other TOCs and ground 
forces, while also facilitating the TOC internal information flow. The battle captain 
position is also critical in influencing staff-level sensemaking. 
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Figure 14.   Sample TOC Message Flow  
(From: Battle Command Training Center, 2006) 
Each position in the TOC has specific tasks assigned to them in order to 
facilitate battle tracking and information flow, and assist the commander in the 
decision-making process. General tasks assigned to the battle captain are (Battle 
Command Training Center, 2006): 
• Keep the Command Group informed 
• Supervise TOC information flow 
• Ensure that battle staff collects, processes, and disseminates 
information 
• Shield Commander from noncritical information 
• Get decisions from the Commander 
• Line supervision of battle staff shift 
• Quality control of battle tracking 
• Battle staff coordination 
• Information link to subordinate, higher, supporting, and adjacent 
units 
• Integration of MDMP activities 
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• Battle staff synchronization during mission execution 
• Ensure the TOC can operate continuously while static or mobile 
2. Current Battle Captain Workstation 
The configuration of the battle captain’s workstation and inclusion of 
information systems must enable the individual to complete the general tasks in 
the most efficient manner possible. Because the battle captain is a central hub in 
the determination of relevant battlefield information used for decision making, 
every aspect of the workstation’s design, layout, and available information 
sources must focus on facilitating that effort. 
In 1991, a state-of-the-art battle captain workstation in the 18th Airborne 
Corps Operations Section consisted of radios, telephones, and analog wall 
charts to track battlefield information (see Figure 15). Over time, as combat 
systems integrated networked information, the battle captain’s workstation also 
became more sophisticated in order to harness available information used in the 
sensemaking and decision-making processes. 
 
 
Figure 15.   XVII Airborne Corps G-3 Workstation (From: Freund, 1991) 
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Recent pictures (see Figure 16) from a Brigade TOC in Afghanistan 
(2011) highlights the changes that have occurred over the years. Each 
workstation includes a computer linked to the secure network, which streams 
real-time battlefield information across multiple screens. Television screens at 
the front of the TOC provide real-time video feeds from manned and UASs. 
Radio, telephone, and even video teleconference communications take place at 
each individual workstation throughout the network. Though wall charts are still 
used, they serve as a backup against power or system failure. 
 
 
Figure 16.   Afghanistan TOC 2011 
The Brigade Assistant Operations Officer (AS3) from the pictured unit (see 
Figure 16) reported that the typical information sources that a battle captain is 
required to monitor at their workstation include (C. Green, personal 
communication, March 5, 2011): 
• CPOF 
• Blue Force Tracker (BFT) or FBCB2 
• Mirc Chat 
• E-mail 
• Radio 
• Secure Voice Over Internet Protocol (SVOIP) phones 
• Analog information kept on wall charts 
• Between two and eight video feeds on the wall (depending on the 
size of the TOC). 
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According to the AS3, the number of digital systems that a battle captain 
must monitor may increase when serving with multinational organizations. Due to 
information and operational security reasons, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) forces are not granted the same access privileges to U.S. networks. The 
Brigade AS3 interviewed stated that each TOC maintained both a U.S. Secret 
Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) and a secure NATO system in order to maintain 
network connectivity with all NATO forces in their Area of Operations (AO). Each 
network operates through similar C2 information systems with different levels of 
security clearance to access particular data. This requires the battle captain to 
monitor two separate systems providing different versions of the same battlefield. 
This presents issues not only with increasing workload, but also with conflicting 
representations of battlefield ground truth. 
At baseline (U.S. information systems only), battle captains in modern 
TOCs currently monitor six or more information sources for relevant information. 
This information is then included in an individual sensemaking process that 
facilitates group sensemaking discussions within the TOC. In emergencies, the 
amount of information streaming over the network may become immense, 
possibly overwhelming an individual’s mental resources. When demand for 
mental resources exceeds the supply available for competing tasks, performance 
will suffer (Dixon & Wickens, 2003). Reduced sensemaking performance leads to 
degraded situational understanding. 
As NCW continues to increase both the information systems linked to the 
network and the amount of information flowing through them, we must consider 
how the number of information sources may impact a battle captain’s 
sensemaking ability. In order to develop information systems that aid both 
individual and staff-level situational understanding and decision making, this 
research investigates the impact on sensemaking by manipulating the number of 
information sources, while controlling the amount of information presented. 
 34 
C. HYPOTHESES 
The literature review has presented many important issues relating to the 
advancement of NCW and sensemaking performance of battle captains. As 
many of the concepts and theories described present many interesting topics 
relating to sensemaking, decision making, information presentation, and the 
workload of battle captains in combat battle-tracking situations, the issues have 
been narrowed to focus on the most relevant pertaining to this study’s specific 
research objectives. The alternative hypotheses generated from the research 
questions are: 
• Ha1: The modern (six-source) battle captain workstation degrades 
sensemaking ability and reduces situational understanding when 
compared to the legacy (two-source) workstation. 
• Ha2: The modern (six-source) battle captain workstation requires 




A controlled laboratory experiment was used to assess battle captain 
sense-making ability while monitoring a simulated battlefield scenario. This study 
was a 2 x 2 crossover design, comparing the number of sources (two-source and 
six-source) in two similar tactical scenarios (11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 
[ACR] and 3rd Brigade [BDE]). Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four groups. Each group was exposed once to each source condition and tactical 
scenario. Table 1 illustrates the design for this study. 
 
  NUMBER OF SOURCES 







11th ACR O X 
3rd BDE X O 
Table 1.   Research Design Example 
 
Table 2 demonstrates how each group corresponds to the source/scenario 
pairing, and the order in which each pairing was presented to the participants 
(1st condition, 2nd condition). The source and condition combinations are 
counterbalanced with this approach to control for any order effect. 
 







A 1st CONDITION     2nd CONDITION 
B 2nd CONDITION     1st CONDITION 
C   1st CONDITION 2nd CONDITION   
D   2nd CONDITION 1st CONDITION   
Table 2.   Groups A-D Source/Pairing and Order 
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The experiment consisted of a battery of pretests followed by two separate 
simulated battlefield scenarios, with each scenario lasting approximately  
40 minutes. During each scenario, participants monitored simulated battlefield 
reports presented through various sources. They were tasked with receiving and 
processing information (both relevant and irrelevant), linking the relevant 
information together, and reporting their understanding of battlefield ground truth 
using Situation Reports (SITREPs) and a paper map. 
B. PARTICIPANTS 
1. Selection 
The Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review Board reviewed and 
approved the design of this study, in accordance with Department of the Navy 
and American Psychological Association (APA) standards. All participants were 
informed of their rights as subjects in the experiment and signed a consent form. 
They also signed consent forms for video and audio recording during the 
experimental trials. Participants were solicited through personal contact, e-mail, 
and flyers. The study used a convenience sample taken from the Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
2. Demographic Makeup 
Thirteen participants started the study, with 12 completing both trials 
(average age = 34.3, standard deviation [SD] = 3.67). One participant withdrew 
from the research and did not complete the second trial. All participants were 
male U.S. Army officers from combat arms branches with previous battle captain 
or battle-tracking experience within a TOC. The ranks of the participants 
completing the research included 2 Captains, 9 Majors, and 1 Lieutenant 
Colonel. Participants’ time in service (TIS) ranged from 9 to 17 years (average 
TIS = 11.8, SD = 2.87). Each participant has spent an average of 23.8 months 
deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan during their career (average months 
deployed = 23.8, SD = 7.69), and participated in an average of 2.7 mission 
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readiness exercises (MREs) at combat training centers (CTCs), where each 
MRE lasts approximately two to three weeks. 
Participant battle captain experiences include both Battalion- and Brigade-
level TOC organizations during combat deployments, as well as CTC rotations. 
Table 3 provides a detailed picture of each participant’s battle captain experience 
with respect to organization level and time on deployment. Six of the 12 
participants reported serving as a battle captain during at least one  
CTC rotation. 
 
Level of TOC 
Experience 
Months as  
Battle Captain 
(Average, SD) 
Months as  
Battle Captain on 
Deployment 
(Average, SD) 
Battalion 8.25, 4.7 7.67, 5.1 
Brigade 4.3, 0.2 5.67, 5.8 
Table 3.   Participant Battle Captain Experience 
 
Each of the 12 participants in this study had experience with networked 
TOC workstation equipment (see Table 4). 
 
TOC System CPOF FBCB2 Mirc Chat Tactical E-Mail Radio 
# Participants with Experience 11 12 10 12 12 




The experiment used four Dell computers; one Apple computer; three flat-
panel monitors; computer speakers; a Fort Irwin, California, 1/50,000 terrain 
map; and a digital, high-definition (HD), video camera to present simulated 
battlefield transmissions to the participants and capture a video of each trial. One 
laptop computer ran each of the three main digital TOC workstation components, 
simulated through Microsoft PowerPoint while the fourth played simulated radio 
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calls. Each of the three laptop computers were connected to secondary monitors 
and placed on the TOC workstation desk. An additional computer was connected 
to the speakers to simulate radio traffic. The equipment list used for this 
experiment provides detailed specifications: 
• 2 x Dell Precision laptops, running Windows XP, Microsoft Office 
2003, with Intel Core 2 Duo, 2.49 GHz, 3.5 GB RAM (simulated  
e-mail and Mirc Chat) 
• 1 x Dell Latitude E6500 laptop, running Windows XP, Microsoft 
Office 2003, with Intel Core 2 Duo, 2.79 Ghz, 1.98 GB RAM 
(simulated CPOF and tactical message traffic) 
• 1 x Dell Latitude D630, running Windows XP, Microsoft Office 2003, 
with Intel Core 2 Duo, 2.39 GHz, 1 GB RAM (ANAM data collection) 
• 1 x Apple Macbook, running Lion OSX, iTunes 10, Garageband 
audio editing program (recorded and edited radio traffic, radio traffic 
playback) 
• 2 x Dell Ultrasharp 17” LCD flat panel displays (displayed e-mail 
and Mirc Chat) 
• 1 x Dell 20” LCD flat panel display (displayed CPOF and tactical 
message traffic) 
• 1 x Sony Hybrid Plus HD video camera, 4 megapixel (session 
recording) 
• 1 x Fort Irwin Training Facilities map, 1/50,000 relief 
• 1 x Polycom sound station speaker phone (collecting SITREPs) 
• 1 x Sony a350 DSLR camera, 12 megapixel (capturing participant 
map rendering) 
• Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics (ANAM4) 
computer program for capturing working memory ability 




Creating a TOC workstation with actual CPOF, Mirc Chat, and e-mail 
capability, properly coordinated with radio traffic, would have been a difficult and 
challenging task, requiring significant financial and technical resources to 
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execute properly. The use of actual tactical workstations would also require 
participants to be proficient in specific TOC systems and would introduce the 
possibility of performance differences based not on their understanding of the 
battlespace, but on their proficiency with the digital systems. Therefore, a 
decision was made to use a lower fidelity simulation designed to assess the 
relevant constructs without requiring expertise on any specific TOC hardware. 
Presenting the scenarios in a controlled environment required creating 
each digital TOC simulation in PowerPoint, using slide transitions to control for 
timing and information flow rate. Radio calls were coordinated with the 
PowerPoint slide presentations to ensure that no overlap of information source 
medium occurred. This approach also eliminated user error from improper screen 
navigation, or possible free play in the scenario from live simulation. See 
Appendix E for screenshots of each PowerPoint simulation. 
D. VARIABLES 
1.  Independent Variables 
a. Number of Sources 
The number of sources used to present information to participants 
varied between two and six source methods. The two-source condition presented 
information using only radio messages and paper copy TOC notes (see 
Appendix D). The six-source condition presented information using, radio, e-mail, 
Mirc Chat (with four chat windows), CPOF-type map, and unit message traffic 
(with three unit message windows). 
b. Scenario 
Different scenarios were used for each trial in order to minimize any 
learning effect. Once a participant was exposed to a particular scenario, he 
would naturally have an understanding of the battlefield events, providing him 
with an unfair advantage with respect to sensemaking. 
 40 
The simulated battlefield scenarios were designed to be similar in terms of 
friendly and enemy unit battle-tracking requirements, level of difficulty, number of 
storylines to follow, task organization simplification, and duration. The battlefield 
scenarios and the method in which each message was relayed to the participant 
are described in Appendix A (Scenario 1) and Appendix B (Scenario 2). 
The friendly units in both scenarios are mechanized, brigade-sized 
forces conducting a search and attack mission against prepared enemy defenses 
within the Fort Irwin maneuver AO. To limit complexity, the task organization for 
each scenario utilized only two battalions with four companies each, with one 
attached scout platoon per battalion. Enemy forces to be tracked in each 
scenario ranged from 10–16 units of platoon-size or larger. Each scenario 
contained story lines involving friendly unit battle damage assessment (BDA), 
enemy unit BDA, enemy indirect fire asset locations, friendly units becoming 
combat ineffective, friendly units losing radio contact, and the status for three 
town populations within the AO. Each story line contained a minimum of 3 and a 
maximum of 10 pieces of information relayed through the various information 
sources during each trial. 
2. Dependent Variables 
a. Situation Report (SITREP) Accuracy 
During each 40-minute scenario, participants provided the 
commander with four detailed SITREPs using the modified SLANT report format. 
A percentage score of the participants’ understanding of ground truth was 
calculated by comparing each SITREP with ground truth at each stage of  
the battle. 
b. Battlefield Ground Truth Map Accuracy 
Participants used the Fort Irwin training area 1/50,000 map at the 
end of the 40-minute scenario to place friendly and enemy unit symbols where 
they believed them to be located on the battlefield. The location of each unit 
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symbol was graded with respect to distance from the actual location, based on 
battlefield ground truth at the end of the scenario. Unit symbols located between 
0 and 1,000 meters received three points; between 1,000 and 3,000 meters 
received two points; between 3,000 and 5,000 meters received one point; and 
any unit over 5,000 meters received a score of zero. 
c. Participant Perceived Workload 
Participants provided the researcher with a subjective workload 
assessment every five minutes during the 40-minute scenario. Participants were 
asked to estimate their perceived workload as a percentage of their capacity. A 
participant who believed he was working at half capacity would report his 
workload was 50%. This method is minimally intrusive and does not require 
participants to conduct retrospective assessments of their workload such as 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX). 
3. Covariate Variables 
a. Working Memory 
Due to the fast-paced nature of military operations, battle captains 
must attend to, retain, and rapidly recall pertinent information when engaged in 
sensemaking activities. A test of each participant’s working memory was 
conducted to determine if this factor influenced their sensemaking ability during 
the trials. Each participant’s working memory was assessed using ANAM4 
(ANAM4, 2007), a computer program run on a laptop. A customized, three-test 
battery (including code substitution [learning], memory search [6], and code 
substitution [delayed]) established a baseline of working memory ability for each 
participant. 
b. Reading Rate and Effective Reading Rate (ERR) 
Due to the high volume of written material, a determination of each 
participant’s reading rate and ERR was required to determine if this factor 
influenced their sensemaking ability during the trials. Each participant read 
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President John F. Kennedy’s 1,447-word inaugural address for time. Participants 
completed five multiple-choice questions to test their comprehension, which was 
scored as a percentage (Sutz & Weverka, 2011). Each participant’s reading rate 
was determined by dividing the number of words in the passage (1,447) by their 
time, providing a score in words per minute (WPM). The “effective reading rate” 
was calculated using the following equation: reading speed (WPM) x 
comprehension (%) = ERR (Sutz & Weverka, 2011). 
E. PROCEDURE 
Participants signed up for two 1.5-hour sessions as their schedules 
allowed. Participants were allowed at least 24 hours between sessions. The 
researcher randomly assigned participants to one of the four conditions (A-D) 
within each group. 
Participants met the researcher in the Human Systems Integration 
Laboratory. After completing the informed consent and consent to video and 
audio recording forms, participants answered a demographic questionnaire (see 
Appendix F). Participants then completed the covariate tests. The specific 
covariate test administered depended on the condition assigned to the participant 
that day. If assigned the two-source condition, he completed the reading test; 
however, if assigned the six-source condition, he completed the working memory 
test battery. 
Participants then received an orientation and initial training session with 
the simulated TOC workstation (see Figure 17). Four laptop computers on the 
other side of the temporary dividers powered the simulation (see Figure 18). The 
initial training session consisted of a prerecorded audio and PowerPoint 
demonstration that familiarized participants with the digital simulations used in 
the TOC workstation (see Appendix E), and SLANT report format (see Appendix 
C). They also received an abbreviated OPORD (see Appendix G) and shift 




Figure 17.   Simulated TOC Workstation 
 
Figure 18.   Computers Powering the Simulation 
A short question-and-answer period followed the orientation to ensure that 
the participants understood the current battlefield situation and the use of the 
simulated TOC equipment. Following any questions, all participants viewed a  
90-second scenario introduction to orient them to the rate of information 
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presented during the trial. Participants were not permitted to take notes during 
this initial familiarization period; however, they were encouraged to consider 
note-taking or battle-tracking methods that could be used during the actual 
scenarios. Following the scenario introduction, the researcher answered all 
remaining questions. Finally, the researcher started the video and audio 
recordings and the 40-minute experimental trial began. 
During the trial, the researcher observed the participant through mirrored 
glass from a separate room. Every 5 minutes, the researcher called the 
participant on the telephone and asked for his current perceived mental 
workload; every 10 minutes, the researcher would call and ask for an updated 
SITREP. The researcher placed the calls when the participant was not actively 
conducting a physical task such as moving unit symbols on the map, writing 
notes, reading messages, or listening to radio calls. After the participants 
received the final piece of information, the researcher entered the room and the 
participants had approximately two minutes to complete their final SITREP. 
Participants were given time to adjust unit symbols to locations they felt 
accurately represented battlefield ground truth. Once finished, the researcher 
asked them to brief the current situation. The video recording was stopped 
following the brief. 
After the trial, the researcher discussed the battlefield situation with the 
participant. General conversation focused on what information may have been 
missed, or deemed irrelevant, throughout the scenario. The researcher also 
answered any questions the participant had about the situation. Following the 
question-and-answer period, participants were released from the study. 
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IV. RESULTS 
The present study collected SITREP report data, map accuracy data, and 
self-reported workload scores from participants during an observation and 
information-processing task. Analysis was performed to determine the effect of 
the number of information sources (two versus six) on SITREP accuracy and 
map accuracy (situational understanding) to address Hypothesis One. Analysis 
was also performed to determine the effect of the number of information sources 
(two versus six) on participants’ self-reported cognitive workload to address 
Hypothesis Two. Data for reading rate, effective reading rate, and working 
memory ability were also collected on each battle captain. The scoring process 
for SITREP and map accuracy data for use in the data analysis was provided in 
Chapter III. An alpha level of 0.05 was used for all statistical tests. 
A. SCENARIO SIMILARITY 
The two simulated battlefield scenarios were designed to be similar in 
terms of friendly and enemy unit battle-tracking requirements, level of difficulty, 
number of storylines to follow, task organization simplification, and duration. Due 
to the crossover design, scenario similarity had to be established in order for data 
to be collapsed across the scenarios. If the scenarios are determined to be 
equivalent, a within-subjects analysis is justified and performance differences 
could then be attributed to the number of information sources. To confirm 
scenario similarity, paired t-tests were conducted with the battle captains’ 
average SITREP scores (see Figure 19), map accuracy scores (see Figure 20), 
and the average self-reported mental workload scores (see Figure 21). 
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Figure 19.   Average SITREP Scores by Scenario 
 
Figure 20.   Map Scores by Scenario 
 
Figure 21.   Average Workload Scores by Scenario 
A significant difference was not detected between the two scenarios in any 
of the three dependent variables: average SITREP scores, t(11)= –1.20,  
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t(11)= –0.854, p= 0.41. Therefore, the assumption is made that the scenarios are 
similar enough to discard the notion that a scenario is a confounding variable in 
subsequent analysis. 
B. SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) ACCURACY 
Each participant provided four SITREPs, representing current situational 
understanding, during each of the two 40-minute scenarios. A percentage score 
of a battle captain’s situational understanding was calculated by comparing each 
SITREP with ground truth at each stage of the battle. Figure 22 presents the 
mean scores of all participants for each of the four SITREPs by source. Each 
source’s SITREP scores progress similarly over time, indicating a loss of 
situational understanding between the 10- (SITREP 1) to 20- (SITREP 2) minute 
situation reports, then leveling out from SITREPs 2 through 4. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Participants Mean SITREP Scores by Source 
To determine the effect of source on SITREP accuracy, a paired t-test was 
conducted using the battle captains’ average SITREP scores from each source 































Figure 23.   Average SITREP Scores by Source 
Acknowledging that each battle captain is different with respect to 
experience, training, and battle-tracking ability, a 2(source) x 4(SITREP) within 
subject Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was also conducted to determine the 
impact of source on SITREP accuracy over time. The source independent 
variable did not have a significant effect on SITREP reporting accuracy (F(3,33)= 
2.48, p= 0.15), thus supporting the paired t-test results. There was also not a 
significant interaction between source and SITREP (F(3,33)= 0.31, p= 0.82). 
However, results do indicate a significant main effect of SITREP accuracy with 
respect to ground truth (F(3, 33)= 10.07, p< 0.001). Posthoc comparison of the 
SITREP scores show that SITREP 1 was significantly different than SITREP 3 
(t(46)= 2.73, p= 0.009) and SITREP 4 (t(46)= 2.37, p= 0.022). A complete 
comparison of p-values is provided in Table 5. 
 
SITREP 1 2 3 4 
1   T(46)= 1.998, p= 0.052 T(46)= 2.730, p= 0.009 T(46)= 2.366, p= 0.022 
2     T(46)= 0.763, p= 0.449 T(46)= 0.471, p= 0.640 
3       T(46)=-0.243, p= 0.809 
4        
Table 5.   SITREP Score Pairwise Comparisons 
C. MAP ACCURACY 
The location of each unit symbol was graded with respect to distance from 












Two Sources Six Sources 
SITREP 
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Figure 24 shows the participants’ mean map scores for two sources (M= 0.693, 
SD= 0.08) and six sources (M= 0.696, SD= 0.08). 
 
 
Figure 24.   Average Map Scores by Source 
A paired t-test was conducted with the battle captains’ map scores, 
indicating that there is not a significant difference between the two- and  
six-source condition, t(11)= 0.09, p= 0.92. 
D. SELF-REPORTED WORKLOAD 
Participants were asked to estimate their perceived workload as a 
percentage of their capacity. This estimate was recorded every 5 minutes during 
the 40-minute trial and then averaged to determine each participant’s mean 
perceived workload estimate. Figure 25 shows the participants’ mean perceived 
workload according to source: two sources (M= 0.713, SD= 0.15) and six 











Figure 25.   Average Workload by Source 
A paired t-test was conducted with the battle captains’ average perceived 
workload scores, indicating that the two-source condition led to a significantly 
higher perceived workload than the six-source condition (t(11)= -4.13, p= 0.002). 
E. COVARIANCE 
Twelve separate regression analyses for every combination of y and 
covariates were tested to determine if there was an effect on the dependent 
variable. We are interested in the p-value of , the coefficient for source (see 
equation in Figure 26). 
 
 
Figure 26.   Covariance Equation 
The dependent variable  is equal to either the  average SITREP 
accuracy, map scores, or average perceived workload scores. 
The covariates are equal to either the memory search, delayed memory, 












Two Sources Six Sources 
Workload 
β1
yˆ = β0 + β1source + β2 covariate + β3(source*covariate)+ ε
yˆ
 51 
1. Working Memory 
Scores from ANAM4’s (ANAM4, 2007) memory search (6), and code 
substitution (delayed) established a baseline working memory ability for each 
participant. ANAM4 produced a normalized percentile rank according to the 
participant’s reaction time, correct responses, and throughput for each test. A 
composite score, found by averaging the three normalized percentiles, was used 
as a covariate during data analysis to account for participants working memory 
ability. Table 6 shows the results of the memory search covariate test for each of 
the three dependent variables. Complete covariance tables are found in 
Appendix I. 
 
  Value SD ( ) t-Score p-Value 
SITREP Accuracy –0.115 0.104 –0.40 0.714 
Map Score –0.005 0.077 –0.06 0.954 
Perceived Workload –0.067 0.156 –0.43 0.673 
Table 6.   Covariate Results for Memory Search 
 
The results indicate that the  coefficient for source is not significant for 
any of the three dependent variables when controlling for the battle captain’s 
memory search ability. 
Table 7 shows the results of the delayed memory covariate test for each 
of the three dependent variables. 
 
  Value SD ( ) t-Score p-Value 
SITREP Accuracy 0.026 0.114 0.23 0.824 
Map Score 0.065 0.073 0.89 0.386 
Perceived Workload –0.017 0.167 –0.10 0.922 






The results indicate that the  coefficient for source is not significant for 
any of the three dependent variables when controlling for the battle captain’s 
delayed memory recall ability. 
2. Effective Reading Rate (ERR) 
Due to the amount of information participants were required to read during 
each trial, it was necessary to capture their ability to read and process 
information. Each participant’s reading rate and ERR was determined in order to 
examine any possible influence on each of the three dependent variables. Table 
8 shows the results of the delayed memory covariate test for each of the three 
dependent variables. 
 
  Value SD ( ) t- Score p- Value 
SITREP Accuracy 0.210 0.127 1.65 0.115 
Map Score 0.114 0.093 1.22 0.235 
Perceived Workload –0.225 0.210 –1.07 0.298 
Table 8.   Covariate Results for Reading Rate 
 
The results indicate that the  coefficient for source is not significant for 
any of the three dependent variables when controlling for the battle captain’s 
reading rate. 
Table 9 shows the results of the delayed memory covariate test for each 
of the three dependent variables. 
 
  Value SD ( ) t- Score p- Value 
SITREP Accuracy 0.135 0.097 1.40 0.177 
Map Score 0.012 0.071 0.18 0.863 
Perceived Workload –0.331 0.158 –2.09 0.049 







The results indicate that the  coefficient for source is not significant for 
SITREP accuracy or map score-dependent variables when controlling for the 
battle captain’s reading rate. However, the source  coefficient is significant for 
perceived workload (t(11)= –2.09, p= 0.049). This indicates that even when 
accounting for the battle captain’s ERR, the source independent variable remains 
significant. 
F. DIGITAL C2 EXPERIENCE (NATIVE VERSUS IMMIGRANT) 
Discussions with participants after each trial revealed an interesting 
characteristic—whether the participant was a C2 digital native or C2 digital 
immigrant. A C2 digital native is an individual whose initial training in C2, or TOC 
experience in the military, was with the digitally networked systems in use today. 
Most Soldiers currently serving in the Army, with less than 12 years TIS, should 
have received initial training on digital systems instead of legacy methods. Digital 
immigrants are individuals whose initial training in C2 took place before the 
advent of networked C2 systems. These individuals learned the legacy methods 
as the primary method of performing battle tracking and immigrated to the digital 
systems as they were fielded into Army units. 
A 2 (C2 digital native or immigrant) x 2 (two-source or six-source) ANOVA 
was used to test for differences in situational understanding performance. 
Results indicate that there was not a significant difference between digital C2 
experience groups (F(1, 20)= 0.381, p= 0.54), or between source  
(F(1, 20)= 1.32, p= 0.26), and the digital C2 experience*source interaction was 
also insignificant (F(1, 20)= 0.881, p= 0.36). 
An ANOVA was also completed to determine the influence of digital C2 
experience on perceived mental workload. Results indicate that there was not a 
significant difference between digital C2 experience groups (F(1, 20)= 0.744,  
p= 0.398). There was also not a significant interaction between digital C2 
experience and source, (F(1, 20)= 0.881, p= 0.359). However, source was 




versus digital immigrant variable. Posthoc comparison of the source (two or six) 
scores for perceived mental workload show that the two-source (M= 0.71, SD= 
0.15) was significantly higher than the six-source (M= 0.55, SD= 0.16), t(22)= 
2.43, p= 0.021). 
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V. DISCUSSION 
A. SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING (HYPOTHESIS 1) 
The hypothesis that the modern battle captain workstation degrades 
sensemaking ability and reduces situational understanding compared to legacy 
workstations was not supported. Statistical tests for both SITREPs and map 
accuracy retained the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the 
modern battle captain workstation (six sources) and the legacy workstation (two 
sources) with respect to SITREP reporting and map accuracy. This indicates that 
when the amount of information presented from the sources remains the same, 
the number of information sources does not affect the sensemaking process. 
1. Results Review 
In this research, insight into the sensemaking process was gained by 
assessing the battle captains’ situational understanding throughout each trial and 
capturing their expectations for unit locations on a map of the battlefield at the 
end of each scenario. To determine the effect of a source, a paired t-test was 
conducted on the average SITREP scores and map accuracy data from each 
source condition. Results showed that the number of sources was not significant 
for SITREP or map accuracy. Furthermore, a 2(source) x 4(SITREP) within 
subject ANOVA was also conducted to determine the impact of a source on 
SITREP accuracy over time. Again, the source independent variable, as well as 
the interaction between source and SITREP was not significant. The results did 
indicate a significant main effect of SITREP accuracy with respect to ground 
truth. A posthoc comparison showed that SITREP 1, recorded 10 minutes into 
the scenario, was significantly different that SITREPs 3 and 4, recorded 30 and 
40 minutes into the scenario, respectively. 
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2. Relevance of Previous Research to Results 
Kramer et al. (1987) indicate that the amount of information presented to 
participants influences workload. From this study, we would predict that, all other 
things being equal, battle captains who have more information to process will 
experience a higher workload than those who have less information to process. 
Wickens’ (2002) MRT model predicts disruption between two or more  
time-shared tasks. This study would also lead us to expect battle captains to 
experience bottlenecks when processing information when the modality of the 
information requires the use of the same cognitive resources. The present study 
was designed so that there would be no difference in the amount of information 
processed, regardless of the number of sources, and that information-processing 
bottlenecks would be minimized. Controlling the rate, type, and method of 
information presentation across source conditions minimized differences, 
ensuring that significant findings could be attributed only to the source 
independent variable. In each trial, battle captains had to switch attention from 
one information source to another, but they did not have to divide attention 
between multiple displays, regardless of the number of information sources. This 
allowed battle captains in each source condition to perceive each piece of 
information as it was presented, and include it in their sensemaking process (as 
depicted in the information-processing model with sensemaking, see Figure 12). 
The data/frame model proposed by Klein et al. (2006b) requires an initial 
mental frame that battle captains use to begin making sense of the battlefield 
scenario. Within the experiment, the OPORD, map orientation, and shift change 
briefing prior to each trial created an initial mental frame for each battle captain. 
The battle captains used this foundation to begin building their sensemaking 
process. Once the scenario started, each battle captain’s personal experience, 
education, training, and perspective influenced his ability to distinguish relevant 
information from irrelevant information. 
According to Klein et al. (2006b), sorting information by relevance is akin 
to determining how data fits into the current mental frame. If the data do not fit 
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into the battle captain’s mental frame, they may be deemed irrelevant and 
discarded. In the DMSC (Miller & Shattuck, 2006), the content of the lenses help 
in determining information relevance. As battle captains included relevant 
information in their sensemaking frames, they improved their situational 
understanding with respect to ground truth. The SITREPs provide insight into 
how the sensemaking process influenced changes in situational understanding 
with respect to ground truth over time. 
The ANOVA results indicate that the battle captains started with a 
relatively high level of situational understanding following the OPORD and shift 
changeover briefing. As the simulated battlefield situation progressed, a constant 
flow of information was provided to them. We expected the battle captains to 
experience greater difficulty determining relevant information during the six-
source condition compared to the two-source condition, because of possible 
distortions in their lenses (Miller & Shattuck, 2006) caused by the switching “cost” 
leading to inaccurate perceptions of the information. Due to the lack of 
significance the number of sources has on situational understanding, the 
expected distortion of the lenses, as explained by the DMSC (Miller & Shattuck, 
2006), must have not occurred. 
3. Explaining Nonsignificance of Source 
The lack of significance suggests that the number of information sources 
may not be nearly as important as the amount of information being presented by 
the sources. The findings indicate that merely increasing the number of 
information sources, while keeping the amount of information constant, does not 
affect a battle captain’s sensemaking process and, ultimately, his ability to 
understand the situation. In an operational setting, however, as the number of 
information sources at a battle captain’s workstation increases, the total amount 
of information presented is unlikely to remain constant. The reason a new 
network node or information terminal is added to a TOC workstation is to provide 
more information to the battle captain. An increase in the number of information 
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sources, with a corresponding increase in information volume, may negatively 
impact the ability of a battle captain to perceive all of the information due to 
modality conflict and the introduction of both parallel and serial information 
processing (Wickens, 2002). This situation may result in information overload, 
where battle captains are burdened with a large supply of unsolicited information, 
some of which may be relevant (Butcher, 1998). When there is more information 
available than capacity to perceive and process the information, the probability of 
not perceiving relevant information increases. During the sensemaking process, 
relevant information not perceived reduces the amount of applicable data in a 
battle captain’s current frame. Consequently, when a frame is missing relevant 
data, a battle captain’s situational understanding will degrade, thus increasing the 
gap with ground truth. 
B. COGNITIVE WORKLOAD (HYPOTHESIS 2) 
Contrary to expectations, the alternative hypothesis was not supported. In 
fact, statistical tests indicate that battle captains’ perceived mental workload 
using the two-source workstation is significantly higher than the six-source 
workstation. This finding shows that when the amount of information is held 
constant between two source conditions, fewer sources created higher workload. 
Though this is good for the Army, as current battle captain workstations currently 
have six or more information sources, it is counterintuitive that this would be  
the case. 
1. Results Review 
Participants were asked to estimate their perceived workload, as a 
percentage of their capacity, every 5 minutes during their 40-minute trial. A 
paired t-test was conducted, with the battle captains’ average perceived workload 
scores indicating that the two-source condition led to significantly higher 
perceived workload than the six-source condition. 
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2. Relevance of Previous Research to Results 
Sarno and Wickens (1995) explain that workload is the relationship 
between resource supply and task demand. Given the fact that the two-source 
condition creates a significantly higher workload, this definition implies that the 
battle captain either had fewer resources available, or the battle-tracking task 
demand during the two-source condition was higher than during the six-source. 
Since information presentation rate, timing, and method was controlled, we do 
not suspect the battle captains had fewer resources to attend to incoming 
information. Therefore, the battle-tracking task for the two-source condition must 
have been more demanding, resulting in an increase in perceived workload. 
Wickens’ (2002) distinction between workload and MRT is that workload 
relates more to performance potential in high-demand situations, where multiple 
resources are capacities used directly relating to actual performance observed. 
Under this distinction, battle captains in the two-source condition have less 
potential to perform at the same level with increasing demand. Because actual 
performance observed through SITREP reporting and map accuracy was equal 
between the source conditions, we must assume that the battle captains’ 
available resources were not used beyond capacity. This raises an interesting 
question as to why performance potential was significantly less in the two-source 
condition, which was contrary to our expectations. The answer may lie in the 
roles of working memory, attention, and perception in the sensemaking process. 
3. Explaining Workload Significance 
Wickens, Gordon and Liu (1998) state that “working memory is the 
temporary ‘workbench’ of the mind, where information is transformed and acted 
on” (p. 155). Only a limited amount of information is perceived and brought into 
working memory for processing. When discussing attention, Wickens et al. 
(p. 172) state, “if we devote our resources to one activity, others are likely to 
suffer.” As sensory information is registered, attention directs an individual’s 
focus to particular pieces of information for processing. The types of attention 
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influencing workload in this case are selective and focused attention. According 
to Wickens et al. “selective attention may be necessary to choose the displayed 
information sources necessary for a given task” while focused attention “allows 
those sources to be perceived without distraction from neighboring sources” 
(p. 228). The statistical significance of the workload results may reflect the 
differing requirements for focused attention across experimental conditions.  
Another possible explanation is the limited capacity of working memory. 
Working memory is “relatively transient and limited to holding a small 
amount of information that may be either rehearsed or ‘worked on’ by other 
cognitive transformations” (Wickens et al., 1998, p. 156). An individual’s ability to 
hold information active in working memory depends on the amount of information 
and time. The well known size of working memory capacity, 7 ±  2 (Miller, 1956) 
chunks of information, explains the amount of information able to be processed 
at any given time. Time is also closely linked to working memory capacity. “The 
strength of information in working memory decays over time unless it is 
periodically reactivated” by cycling through it (Wickens et al., 1998 p. 158). 
Wickens et al. also list attention as an additional factor that contributes to working 
memory decay. Attention is required to cycle through information chunks held in 
working memory to keep it active. Diverting attention away from information 
reactivation allows it to decay and eventually be lost from working memory. 
A battle captain must employ focused attention while listening to radio 
calls in the TOC in order to properly perceive the information without distraction. 
During the two-source condition, the information was divided as follows: 60% 
radio calls and 40% paper notes. The perishable nature of radio calls required 
significant focused attention and reactivation in working memory in order to 
include relevant information in the sensemaking process. The radio calls were 
not played back or repeated; therefore, if the battle captain did not perceive a 
piece of information from the sensory register or lost it from working memory due 
to decay, it could not be used in the sensemaking process. Since the SITREP 
performance between the source conditions was not significantly different, the 
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battle captains could have dedicated sufficient attention to the radio calls and 
working memory information reactivation during the two-source condition to 
perform as well as they did in the six-source condition. The increased 
requirement for focused attention during the two source condition to perceive 
information from the sensory register and maintain information in working 
memory appears to create a significantly higher perceived workload. 
In contrast, the six-source condition had roughly 25% radio reports, with 
the remaining information spread evenly across the five other information 
sources. In the six-source condition, the other sources were persistent. In this 
instance, persistent refers to the fact that the information did not disappear 
immediately after it was read. Messages remained on the screen until the next 
message arrived, at which point the previous message moved up the screen until 
it was eventually pushed off by incoming messages. This created a situation 
where a significant portion of recently reported information was available across 
five information sources at any given time, while the radio was the only source 
requiring focused attention at the time of transmission. The remaining sources 
could be attended to as needed and were less time critical; therefore, the 
information did not require as much attention to reactivate the information to 
maintain it in working memory. Contrary to what we hypothesized, we suspect it 
is this difference that created significantly higher perceived mental workload in 
the two-source condition. 
4. Sensemaking Process Model (Revision) 
The information-processing model with sensemaking presented earlier in  
Figure 12, did not include attention and incorrectly attributed attention resources 
solely to cognitive processes. In light of the perceived mental workload results’ 
significance, the model should be revised to account for our findings. 
The initial information-processing model with sensemaking (again, see 
Figure 12) proposed that information followed a linear path, from sensory 
information through perception, into the sensemaking process. Attention 
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resources were attributed to perception, sensemaking, decision making, and 
action guidance. Review of the perceived mental workload results, and the 
ensuing discussion in Section 3 of this chapter, highlight the role of attention in 
the early phases of information perception as well as within working memory. 
Attention directs where and how the individuals focus their cognitive processing 
resources. Further review of the literature found that the lenses in the DMSC 
(Miller & Shattuck, 2006) provide a satisfactory explanation as to how attention 
fits into the sensemaking process model. Shattuck and Miller (2006) describe 
how the lenses direct attention, therefore, Figure 27 inserts the lenses from 
DMSC into the original model from Figure 12, which enables us to account for 
directed and focused attention.  
 
 
Figure 27.   Sensemaking Process Model 
The sensemaking process is now depicted within working memory, 
previously referred to by Wickens et al. (1998) as the “workbench of the mind 
where information is transformed and acted on” (p. 155), to account for the 
conscious and active nature of the sensemaking process. The arrow from 
attention now points to working memory instead of the sensemaking process due 
to the attention required for information reactivation to reduce information decay 
over time. In the updated sensemaking processes model, situation understanding 
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now encompasses both working memory and long term memory, acknowledging 
the fact that an individual’s current understanding of the situation is a product of 
new information from the environment combined with stored information in long-
term memory.  
As information sensed from the environment and the action guidance 
feedback loop propagate through the model, it first encounters Lens A. Lens A 
filters incoming information based on the current mental frame of the 
sensemaking process, provided by the situational understanding feedback loop. 
As a result, the Information passing through Lens A into perception is restricted 
to sources believed to contain relevant information that must be attended to, 
based on the current frame in situational understanding. 
As perceived information passes through Lens B into working memory, the 
lens influences how information is organized and fits into the current frame of the 
sensemaking process in a manner that improves situational understanding with 
respect to ground truth. This interaction requires focused attention to ensure 
proper placement of relevant information into the frame. If attention resources are 
not dedicated to this process, relevant information may be deemed irrelevant due 
to a perceived lack of fit with the current frame and discarded. This situation 
explains how overloaded individuals who may perceive relevant information, are 
unable to properly fit it into the sensemaking frame. Due to the demand on their 
scarce attention resources (in the two-source condition), they may overlook 
relevant information in order to process incoming relevant information. 
In our original information-processing model with sensemaking, we stated 
that the battle captain determines information relevance during the sensemaking 
process. Though the ultimate decision of information relevance is determined 
during sensemaking within working memory, the objects of a battle captain’s 
selective and focused attention suggest that source relevance is determined by 
prior iterations of the sensemaking process that guide attention through the 
feedback loops to Lenses A and B. Attention resources also influence the 
sensemaking process as information in working memory is reactivated and 
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maintained until it is either included in the current sensemaking frame, discarded 
due to irrelevance, or decays from working memory.  
The goal of the sensemaking process remains the same—to improve 
situational understanding with respect to ground truth. As newly developed 
situational understanding passes through Lens C, the information elements 
within the lens focus the projections of mental models. The battle captain creates 
a future prediction of the situation that informs the decision-making process and 
creates action guidance, based on the interaction of informational elements 
contained within the lens and situational understanding. 
The revised sensemaking process model is able to explain the 
significantly higher perceived mental workload that battle captains reported in the 
two-source condition. Information reported over the radio is perishable; therefore, 
if selective attention resources are not directed to radio reports as they occur, the 
information may be not be perceived or reactivated within working memory. 
Because the battle captains’ situational understanding performance was the 
same between the two conditions, we can infer that the increase in perceived 
mental workload can be attributed to attention or the increased need to reactivate 
perishable information in working memory. Since the scenarios presented 
information in a strictly serial manner, battle captains were not required to divide 
attention in order to perceive information. Due to the source conditions and radio 
report percentage differences (60% for two sources and 25% for six sources), the 
amount of time that focused attention in Lens A was required to accurately 
perceive information about the battlefield situation in the two-source condition 
was higher. This also created a situation where more information required 
reactivation in working memory due to the perishable nature of the radio reports. 
This increased attention requirement explains the increased perceived mental 
workload during this research. 
 65 
C. DIGITAL NATIVE VERSUS DIGITAL IMMIGRANT 
During posthoc interviews with participants, an interesting, and possibly 
impactful, variable was discovered. Initial comments made by participants 
following the trials focused around workstation preference. Some stated that they 
preferred the “old way” of battle tracking, referring to the legacy workstation, 
while others stated that they felt “back at home” once they sat down at the 
experiment’s digital workstation. These comments suggested the need to 
account for their experience and training history with each battle-tracking 
method. Knowing if they were digital natives or digital immigrants might explain 
performance results from another perspective—training and experience. A digital 
native is defined as an individual whose initial military training in C2 or TOC 
experience was with the digitally networked systems in use today. Digital 
immigrants are individuals whose initial training in C2 took place before the 
advent of digital C2 systems. 
Post-hoc interviews provided the digital native or digital immigrant 
information. An ANOVA was used to determine the influence that training or 
experience may have had on battle captain performance. The results of this 
research show that neither perceived workload nor situational understanding was 
impacted by C2 experience (digital versus native).The interactions between the 
number of sources and digital C2 experience for perceived workload and 
situational understanding were also insignificant. The lack of significance in both 
the situational understanding and perceived mental workload results, with 
respect to digital C2 experience across the number of sources, infers that proper 
training and system design may mitigate the influence of initial experience. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
During the course of this research effort, we found that when a fixed 
amount of information is presented to a battle captain by a differing number of 
sources (two and six), the impact on situational understanding is not significant. 
Contrary to expectations, the perceived mental workload that battle captain’s 
experienced while tracking a simulated battlefield situation was significantly 
higher for the two-source (analog, legacy) condition than for the six-source 
(current, digital) condition. Posthoc analysis to determine the influence of initial 
training and experience on a battle captain’s situational understanding and 
perceived mental workload concluded that digital C2 experience (digital native 
versus digital immigrant) was not a significant predictor of either situational 
understanding or mental workload. 
The design of this study controlled the rate, type, and method of 
information presentation to the battle captain in order to test the impact of the 
number of information sources on situational understanding and perceived 
mental workload. Results of this research, where information rate is controlled, 
allows us to discard the number of sources from the possible variables that 
influence the sensemaking process and situational understanding. Though we 
expected to see significant results based on our review of the literature, the fact 
that we did not implies that the characteristics of the information and the attention 
resources of the individual must play an even greater role in the sensemaking 
process and situational understanding than previously thought.  
We did find a significant difference in the level of perceived mental 
workload with respect to the number of information sources. While contrary to our 
hypothesis, this finding indicates that the method of information presentation 
influences cognitive workload. Perishable information presented to battle 
captains through sources that require increased attention in order to perceive 
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and reactivate that information in working memory may degrade battle-tracking 
performance in overload situations. Because we controlled the information 
presentation rate and source type throughout the experiment, the battle captains 
were never put into a situation where sensory modalities were overloaded. 
However, the significantly higher perceived mental workload in the two-source 
condition instead of the six-source shows that the source type (e.g., radio, e-mail, 
moving map), in conjunction with the attention required to properly perceive the 
information and keep it active in working memory, may have profound effects on 
situational understanding performance during battle-tracking tasks. 
 The initial information process model with sensemaking we proposed in 
this paper did not properly explain the statistically significant results of perceived 
mental workload in the two-source condition; therefore, the model was revised. 
Incorporating the lenses from the Shattuck and Miller (2006) DMSC helped 
explain the role of attention resources as information propagates through the 
model. The DMSC was originally created to combine the technological aspects of 
a system with the human perceptual and cognitive processes (Shattuck & Miller, 
2006). When we incorporate the lenses into the revised model we can account 
for the role of attention in the flow of information. By encompassing the 
sensemaking process within working memory, the adjusted model more 
accurately explains the perceived mental workload results and should also 
predict performance in similar situations in the future. The revised model can be 
applied to a broad range of scenarios that include the interaction of humans with 
technological systems. 
The computer age continues to facilitate the integration of networks in 
military communications. In order to develop and exploit an information 
advantage over the enemy, the method in which information is presented to 
battle captains and other decision makers must be controlled. According to 
results of this research, placing another information source, or network node, on 
a battle captain’s workstation will not impact situational understanding only if the 
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information source does not increase the cumulative amount of information 
presented to the battle captain from all sources currently located on  
the workstation. 
As information sources are added to workstations, the method in which 
individuals interact or attend to the information sources will become increasingly 
important to ensure operator mental workload remains below capacity. If a 
number of information sources at a battle captain’s workstation require selective 
or focused attention, he or she may become overwhelmed with information. 
Battle captains overwhelmed with information may be unable to successfully 
process everything (Broadbent, 1971) due to scarce attention resources. 
Results of this research could have implications for the design of future 
information systems and networked workstations in TOCs. Simply adding an 
information source to a TOC workstation may not have the effect of increased 
situational understanding. All information sources located at each workstation 
must be reviewed, while accounting for information flow rates, presentation 
methods, type of information, and attention resources required to properly 
perceive the information. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
There are many opportunities to expand our understanding of the effect 
that information sources, information flow rates, and attention requirements have 
on our ability to properly perceive information, make sense of information, and 
develop an accurate situational understanding with respect to ground truth. In the 
course of this research, video of each experimental trial was captured, but not 
analyzed. Reviewing the video footage in order to conduct a task analysis of 
battle-tracking activities between source conditions may provide additional insight 
into what information was perceived, missed, or interpreted differently during the 
trials. Task analysis findings may help strengthen statistical results by providing 
both qualitative and quantitative descriptions of a battle captain’s battle-tracking 
performance across both source conditions. 
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The research findings also suggest a need for follow-on studies. A field 
study should investigate information flow rates in digital TOCs for each 
information source and consider how flow rates change across TOCs, based on 
factors such as the number of information sources, echelon of command, and 
operational tempo. Results of the field study may then be used to design an 
experiment that incorporates information flow rates representative of the 
operational environment into an experiment similar to the study reported herein. 
Participants in a study with operationally relevant flow rates may experience 
increased mental workload and degraded situational understanding as both the 
number of sources and the information volume increase. 
Future research also should examine the attention requirements for the 
different information sources monitored by battle captains. Also, determining the 
cognitive workload required by different information sources may provide insight 
into how workstations should be arranged, what information sources should be 
separated because they use the same attentional resources, and how to keep 
cognitive workload levels below capacity.  Findings from these future studies will 
lead to the development of NCW C2 systems in which information is properly 
perceived, leading to accurate situational understanding. 
Understanding the cognitive processes that play a role in attending to and 
accurately perceiving information, while conducting sensemaking to improve 
situational understanding is important to developing future command and control 
workstations that enable decision makers to close the gap between situational 
understanding and ground truth. We must re-examine how decisions are made 
concerning adding information sources to TOC workstations and the unforeseen 
consequences of these decisions with respect to situational understanding and 
mental workload. Future research must focus on how to optimize information 
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APPENDIX C. SLANT REPORT 
 
Figure 28.   Scenario 1, SITREP, SLANT Report 
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Figure 29.   Scenario 2, SITREP, SLANT Report 
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APPENDIX E. DIGITAL TOC SIMULATION SCREENSHOTS 
 
Figure 30.   E-Mail Simulation Screenshot 
 
Figure 31.   Mirc Chat Simulation Screenshot 
 94 
 
Figure 32.   CPOF and Message Traffic Simulation Screenshot 
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APPENDIX G. OPERATIONS ORDERS 
Scenario 1, Operations Order 
 





11th ACR Control: 
 
1st Squadron 11th ACR: 
 
2d Squadron 11th ACR: 
 
 
1.b. Unit Task Purpose 
1st Sqdn 
(Ironhorse) 
Disrupt enemy forces N of Bicycle Lake Airfield Prevent enemy from massing combat power on 
Bicycle Lake Airfield 
2d Sqdn 
(Eaglehorse) 
Clear Bicycle Lake Airfield of enemy forces Deny enemy ability to use airfield for operations 
Scout 1 Occupy OP1  Support 2-11 with ISR information on OBJ Hester 
Scout 2 Occupy OP2 Support 11 ACR with ISR information W of AO 
Irwin 
   
   
1.c.  Unit Attach/Detach Instructions 
Aviation Detached to 3 ACR for duration of operation 
ISR support Detached to 3 ACR for duration of operation 
  
2. Mission:      
 O/O, 11th ACR attacks on Axis Rhineland to clear OBJ HESTER, vic Bicycle Lake Airfield (NV3004) to Deny enemy 
use of airfield 
 
3. INTENT- Purpose:  
Maneuver units will conduct a search and attack to destroy all enemy forces established in defensive positions in the area 
that may interdict the Regiment as it prepares for follow-on operations. All airfields and possible landing strips must be 




Secure bicycle lake airfield and usable high ground on Tiefort Mountain; 
Establish secure mobility corridor though central valley on MSR East Range Road; 
Establish contact with town mayors in Medina Wasl, Medina Jabal and Irwin, gain and maintain civilian population support; 
Locate and destroy enemy IDF capability; 
Clear all enemy minefields, destroy weapons caches 
 
EndState:   
Area of operations (AO) clear of enemy forces, airfields and possible landing strips secure; 
Enemy indirect fires (IDF) unable to engage friendly forces; 
Civilian population protected, supported, and secure in where they live;  
Local leaders willing to provide information about enemy forces; 
Friendly units have freedom of movement on and off roads, enemy obstacles cleared, minefields neutralized;  











3.a. Concept of Operations:   (Phase II only) 
Phase IIA – Clear Objective Hester (Decisive): This phase begins when 1-11 ACR crosses phase line Abrams and attacks 
on Axis Rhineland. 2-11 follows 1-11 until reaching PL Laughlin, then 2-11 maneuvers south of 1-11 and attacks to clear 
OBJ Hester. 2-11 must establish a blocking position to the south to secure the southern flank of the Regiment. 1-11 
conducts hasty clearing and occupation of OBJ Wilcox (Medina Wasl) and OBJ Peare (Medina Jabal) while establishing 
blocking positions in Granite pass to the N to secure northern flank and on MSR East Range Road, E of OBJ Peare. Fires 
priority to counterbattery and C2 nodes. At the end of this phase, 1-11 occupies OBJ Wilcox and OBJ Peare, established 
BP on Northern flank and screening force to the East. 2-11 has cleared OBJ Hester, established a BP to the South. Enemy 
IDF location identified. Friendly forces complete refuel and rearm in preparation for Phase III. 
 
 
DP# When Grid Decision (Action) Criteria 
1 1-11 
Contact 
Axis Rhineland Redirect adjacent unit from primary 
mission to engaging enemy forces in 
central valley 
1-11 decisively engaged by superior enemy 
force, or, Squadron combat power reduced 
below 70% 
2 All AO Irwin Commit Reserve Company to maneuver 
squadron 
Company element reduced below 80% 
effectiveness during ongoing TIC. 
 
If maneuver squadron is engaged by Brigade 





AO Irwin Commit Engineer assets to deliberate 
clearance of minefield and/or obstacle 
belts 
Identification of minefield on Axis Rhineland. 
Unable to bypass minefield or obstacle belt 
 
Enemy forces no longer able to place effective 
fires on the obstacle or minefield location  
 
 
Concept of Fires: 
11th ACR has no dedicated artillery for this operation.  
Close air support is on call from fixed wing and rotary wing assets controlled by division HQ. 
   
3.a.1. Scheme of Maneuver: 
 
Event> PL Abrams PL Laughlin Clear OBJ Hester Clear Axis Rhineland Consolidate/ 
Reorganize 
Unit       Est Time> H Hour H+30 H+2 H+2:30 H+3:30 
1-11 ACR 2d in OOM 2d in OOM Clear OBJ Wilcox 
and OBJ Peare 
Clear Axis Rhineland 
to gridline 50-Easting 
Prep for follow on 
operations 
2-11 ACR 3d in OOM Begin ATK South to 
OBJ HESTER 
Clear OBJ Hester Clear OBJ Hester Prep for follow on 
operations 
EN Co. 11 ACR Lead element IED 
clearance 




Support Priority: 2-11, 
1-11 
Prep for follow on 
operations 
      
 
Fire Support 
All fire support is provided by organic IDF assets within each squadron. 
CCA is on call. Priority to 2-11 then 1-11. 
 
M-CM-S     
Phase II Mobility to PL Laughlin: obstacle/IED clearance- 1-11, 2-11 











Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon (ISR) Priorities:   
(Phase or by Phase Line) 
Situation 
Development 




1: Locate and Target IDF locations  IDF locations   
2: Location of enemy Brigade headquarters  HQ locations   
3: Locate or Support missing or cutoff CF unit      
 
b. Man Units Tasks (Phase II ONLY) 
1-11 ACR 1. O/O attack into AO Irwin 
2. Clear Axis Rhineland of IEDs 
3. Establish BP vic. Granite Pass in the N 
4. Occupy OBJ Wilcox 
5. Occupy OBJ Peare 
6. Establish screen-line E of OBJ Peare on East Range Rd 
7. Conduct rearm and refit in place and prepare for follow on missions 
2-11 ACR 1. O/O attack into AO Irwin 
2. Follow 1-11 on Axis Rhineland until crossing PL Laughlin 
3. Attack South after PL Laughlin 
4. Establish BP on MSR S of OBJ Hester 
5. Clear OBJ Hester 
6. Conduct rearm and refit in place and prepare for follow on missions 
Scout 1 1. Infiltrate AO Irwin ahead of 1-11 and report enemy disposition when observed 
2. Occupy OP 1 vic Millers Hole (NV3808) and report activity on OBJ Hester 
3. Provide enemy obstacle and minefield information to 2d Squadron 
4. Observe and report enemy disposition and activity surrounding OBJ Hester 
Scout 2 1. Infiltrate AO Irwin ahead of 1-11 and report enemy disposition when observed 
2. Occupy OP 2 vic NV4305 on Tiefort Mtn 
3. Observe and report enemy disposition and activity E and S of Tiefort Mtn 
 
c.CS Units Task 
 ENG CO 1. O/O attack into AO Irwin 
2. Provide IED clearance support for 1-11 on Axis Rhineland 
3. Establish Regiment rear security W of OBJ Wilcox 
4. O/O coordinate movement through and conduct coordination with Squadrons in AO to clear obstacles 
as required 
5. O/O coordinate movement through and conduct coordination with Squadrons in AO to clear minefields 
as required 
 ADA CO 1. Prepare for split section ADA coverage 
2. Section 1 occupies firing position on Eastern screening boundary with 1-11 
3. Section 2 Occupies firing position on Northern BP with 1-11 
 MP 1. Secure any EPW’s or detainees from maneuver units 
2. Establish detention holding facility near OBJ Wilcox and report location when established 
 
3.d.  Coordinating Instructions 
# Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) Start End Why?    
(DP or HPT) 
1 What is the location, or suspected location of enemy IDF assets? All All HPT 
2 What is the composition and disposition of 1-77th forces at Bicycle Lake? Phase II Phase II  
3 What is the composition and disposition of 1-77th forces on Axis Rhineland All All  
4 Location of aviation assets capable of CCA All All HPT 













# Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR) Start End DP# 
6 Blocking positions making enemy contact with equal or superior enemy force Phase II Phase II  
7 Any maneuver company that becomes combat ineffective (less than 80% combat 
power) 
All All 2 
8 Loss of contact with any maneuver element (platoon or higher) for 15min or more All All  
9 Loss of Platoon Sergeant (PSG) or higher All All  
 
# Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) Start End 
10 Time and location of 2d Squadron attack on Bicycle Lake airfield Phase II Phase II 
11 Location and disposition of Reserve Company All All 
12 Location of friendly indirect fire assets in AO Irwin Phase II Phase II 
13 Location of Squadron command posts All  All 
 
4.  Service Support. 
Push critical supplies to support consolidation, rearm and refit of all Regiment units. Priority of support: 2-11 then 1-11. 
Maintenance, forward resupply 2 DOS of critical combat resources (Class V, Class IIIB and Class IV). 
 
5.a. Command:  (Phase II ONLY) 
Location of Commander: Commander is located with 1-11 during initial movement then relocating to the TAC as 2-11 
maneuvers to ATK Hester 
 
b. Signal:   
 
 
Unit Position Call sign 
11 ACR  Commander Blackhorse 6 
11 ACR S3 Operations Officer Blackhorse 3 
11 ACR Assistant S3 (Battle Captain) Blackhorse 3A 
11ACR TOC Radio Operator Blackhorse X-Ray 
   
1-11 Commander Bengal 6 
1-11 S3 Operations Officer Bengal 3 
1-11 Assistant S3 Operations Officer  Bengal 3A 
1-11 A Co Commander (Mech Infantry) Assassin 6 
1-11 B Co Commander (Mech Infantry) Blackjack 6 
1-11 C Co Commander (Tank Company) Cold Steel 6 
1-11 D Co Commander (Tank Company) Death Dealer 6 
1-11 I Company (ADA) Krazy Horse 6 
   
2-11 Commander Battle 6 
2-11 S3 Operations Officer Battle 3 
2-11 Assistant S3 Operations Officer  Battle 3A 
2-11 E Co Commander (Mech Infantry) Easy 6 
2-11 F Co Commander (Mech Infantry) Fox 6 
2-11 G Co Commander (Tank Company) Gunslinger 6 
2-11 H Co Commander (Tank Company) Havoc 6 
2-11 K Troop (Anti tank Company) Killer 6 
   
Scout 1 Scout 1 section Ghost 1-6 
Scout 2 Scout 2 Section Ghost 2-6 
   
Engineers Engineer Company Commander Blacksmith 6 
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Scenario 2, Operations Order 
 













1.b. Unit Task Purpose 
1-32IN 10th 
MTN (Chosin) 
Clear OBJ ORR (Bicycle Lake Airfield)  Prevent enemy ability to use airfield for operations 




Clear enemy forces N of OBJ ORR (Bicycle Lake 
Airfield)  
Allow freedom of movement for follow-on division 
operations 
Scout 1 Occupy OP1  Support 2-87 with ISR information 
Scout 2 Occupy OP2 Support 1-32 with ISR information 
   
   
1.c.  Unit Attach/Detach Instructions 
Aviation None 
ISR support Division level Predator available 
  
2. Mission:      
 O/O, 3d Brigade 10th Mountain attacks on Axis Chosin to clear the Division mobility corridor Mountain Climber 
allowing freedom of movement for follow-on Division operations 
 
3. INTENT- Purpose:  
Maneuver units will conduct a search and attack to destroy all enemy forces established in defensive positions in the area 
that may interdict the Brigade as it prepares for follow-on operations. All airfields and possible landing strips must be 




Secure bicycle lake airfield and usable high ground on Tiefort Mountain and northern high ground; 
Establish secure mobility corridor though central valley on MSR East Range Road; 
Limit enemy ability to withdraw and reconstitute; 
Locate and destroy enemy IDF capability; 
Clear all enemy minefields, clear IEDs, destroy weapons caches 
 
EndState:   
Area of operations (AO) clear of enemy forces, airfields and possible landing strips secure; 
Enemy indirect fires (IDF) unable to engage friendly forces in mobility corridor Mountain Climber; 
Enemy unable to reconstitute a force large enough to mount a successful defense or counterattack;  
Limited damage to towns and surrounding villages; 
Local leaders willing to provide information about enemy forces; 
Friendly units have freedom of movement on and off roads, enemy obstacles cleared, minefields neutralized;  
Maintain Troop size elements at 80% or higher to support follow-on operations 
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3.a. Concept of Operations:   (Phase II only) 
Phase IIA – Clear Objective Orr (supporting), Miller (Decisive), and Telley (decisive): This phase begins when 2-87IN 
crosses phase line Albaugh and attacks on Axis Chosin. 1-32 follows 2-87 until reaching PL Briseno, then 1-32 maneuvers 
south of 2-87 and attacks to clear OBJ Orr. 2-87 executes hasty clearance of OBJ Miller (Medina Wasl) and OBJ Telley 
(Medina Jabal) enroute to identified enemy defensive positions N of OBJ Telley. Fires priority to counterbattery and C2 
nodes. At the end of this phase, 1-32 occupies OBJ Orr. 2-87 has cleared OBJ Miller and OBJ Telley and enemy defensive 
positions E to the 50-easting gridline.  Enemy IDF locations identified. Friendly forces complete refuel and rearm in 
preparation for Phase IIB. 
 
 
DP# When Grid Decision (Action) Criteria 
1 Enemy 
Contact 
AO Irwin Redirect unit from primary mission to engage 
enemy forces in another AO 
Battalion requires assistance 
2 All AO Irwin Commit Reserve Company to maneuver 
squadron 
Company element reduced below 80% effectiveness 
during ongoing TIC. 
 






AO Irwin Commit Engineer assets to deliberate 
clearance of minefield and/or obstacle belts 
Identification of minefield on Axis Rhineland. 
Unable to bypass minefield or obstacle belt 
 
Enemy forces no longer able to place effective fires 
on the obstacle or minefield location  
 
 
Concept of Fires: 
3d Brigade has a battery of 105s moving in support of the operation. 
The 105’s are to follow 1-32 and provide supporting fires for their clearance of OBJ ORR. 
 
Close air support is on call from fixed wing and rotary wing assets controlled by division HQ. 
New document 
   
3.a.1. Scheme of Maneuver: 
 
Event> PL Albuagh PL Briseno Clear OBJ Orr, 
OBJ Telley, OBJ 
Miller 
Clear Axis Chosin Consolidate /  
Reorganize 
Unit       Est Time> H Hour H+30 H+2 H+2:30 H+3:30 
2-87 IN  2d in OOM on Axis 
Chosin 
2d in OOM on Axis 
Chosin 
Clear OBJ Telley 
and OBJ Miller 
Clear Axis Chosin to 
gridline 50 Easting 
Prep for follow-on 
operations 
1-32 IN 3d in OOM on Axis 
Chosin 
Begin ATK Sout to 
OBJ Hester 
Clear OBJ Orr Clear OBJ Orr Prep for follow-on 
operations 
EN Co Lead element IED 
clearance 






Prep for follow-on 
operations 
      
 
Fire Support      
 3d Infantry Brigade has a battery of 105’s in support. Priority for 105s goes to 2-87 for the duration of the operation. 
Close air support is on call from fixed wing and rotary wing assets controlled by division HQ. 
 
M-CM-S        
Phase II Mobility to PL Briseno: Obstacle/IED clearance- 2-87, 1-32 










Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon (ISR) Priorities:   
(Phase or by Phase Line) 
Situation 
Development 




1: Locate and Target IDF locations  IDF locations   
2: Location of enemy Brigade headquarters  HQ locations   
3: Locate or Support missing or cutoff CF unit      
 
b. Man Units Tasks (Phase II ONLY) 
2-87IN 1. O/O attack on Axis Chosin 
2. Clear Axis Chosin of IEDs 
3. Clear OBJ MILLER (Medina Wasl) 
4. Clear OBJ TELLEY (Medina Jabal) 
5. Clear enemy defensive positions to the 50-Easting gridline 
6. Conduct rearm and refit in place and prepare for follow on missions 
1-32IN 1. O/O attack on Axis Chosin 
2. Follow 2-87 on axis Chosin until crossing PL Briseno 
3. Attack South after PL Briseno 
4. Maintain Brigade rear security throughout operation 
5. Clear OBJ ORR 
6. Conduct rearm and refit in place and prepare for follow on missions 
Scout 1 1. Infiltrate AO ahead of 2-87 and report enemy disposition when observed 
2. Occupy OP 1 vic N of mobility corridor (NV425145) and report activity in mobility corridor Mountain 
Climber 
3. Provide enemy obstacle and minefield information to 2-87 
4. Observe and report enemy disposition and activity surrounding OBJ MILLER and OBJ TELLEY 
Scout 2 1. Infiltrate AO Irwin ahead of 2-87 and report enemy disposition when observed 
2. Occupy OP 2 vic NV385041 on Tiefort Mtn 
3. Observe and report enemy disposition and activity E and S of Tiefort Mtn to 1-32IN 
 
c.CS Units Task 
 ENG CO 1. O/O attack on Axis Chosin 
2. Provide IED clearance support for 2-87 on Axis Chosin 
3. O/O coordinate movement through and conduct coordination with Battalions in AO to clear obstacles 
as required 
4. O/O coordinate movement through and conduct coordination with Squadrons in AO to clear minefields 
as required 
 MP 1. Secure any EPW’s or detainees from maneuver units 
2. Establish detention holding facility near OBJ ORR and report location when established 
 
3.d.  Coordinating Instructions 
# Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) Start End Why?    
(DP or HPT) 
1 What is the location, or suspected location of enemy IDF assets? All All HPT 
2 What is the composition and disposition of 1-78th forces at Bicycle Lake? Phase II Phase II  
3 What is the composition and disposition of 1-78th forces on Axis Chosin All All  
4 Location of aviation assets capable of CCA All All  
5 Status of civilian population regarding presence of CF forces All All  
 
# Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR) Start End DP# 
6 Blocking positions making enemy contact with equal or superior enemy force Phase II Phase II  
7 Any maneuver company that becomes combat ineffective (less than 80% combat 
power) 
All All 2 
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8 Loss of contact with any maneuver element (platoon or higher) for more than 15min All All  
9 Loss of Platoon Sergeant (PSG) or higher All All  
 
# Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) Start End 
10 Time and location of 1-32 IN attack on Bicycle Lake airfield Phase II Phase II 
11 Location and disposition of Reserve Company All All 
12 Location of friendly indirect fire assets on Axis Chosin Phase II Phase II 
13 Location of Squadron command posts All  All 
 
4.  Service Support. 
Push critical supplies to support consolidation, rearm and refit of all Brigade units. Priority of support: 2-87 then 1-32. 
Maintenance, forward resupply 2 DOS of critical combat resources (Class V, Class IIIB and Class IV). 
 
 
5.a. Command:  (Phase II ONLY) 
Location of Commander: Commander is located with 2-87 during initial movement then relocating to the TAC as 1-32 
maneuvers to ATK OBJ ORR 
 
b. Signal:   
 
 
Unit Position Call sign 
3d BDE  Commander Spartan 6 
3d BDE S3 Operations Officer Spartan 3 
3d BDE Assistant S3 (Battle Captain) Spartan 3A 
3d BDE TOC Radio Operator Spartan X-Ray 
   
2-87 Commander Cat 6 
2-87 S3 Operations Officer Cat 3 
2-87 Assistant S3 Operations Officer  Cat 3A 
2-87 A Co Commander (Mech Infantry) Apache 6 
2-87 B Co Commander (Mech Infantry) Blackhawk 6 
2-87 C Co Commander (Tank Company) Comanche 6 
2-87 D Co Commander (Tank Company) Destroyer 6 
   
1-32 Commander Chosin 6 
1-32 S3 Operations Officer Chosin 3 
1-32 Assistant S3 Operations Officer  Chosin 3A 
1-32 A Co Commander (Mech Infantry) Attack 6 
1-32 B Co Commander (Mech Infantry) Battle 6 
1-32 C Co Commander (Tank Company) Combat 6 
1-32 D Co Commander (Tank Company) Delta 6 
   
Scout 1 Scout 1 section Ghost 1-6 
Scout 2 Scout 2 Section Ghost 2-6 
   







APPENDIX H. SHIFT CHANGEOVER BRIEFS 

























  Value SD ( ) t-Score p-Value 
 –0.039 0.073   
 –0.115 0.104 –0.4 0.714 
 0.177 0.121 –1.0 0.351 
 –0.039 0.171 1.0 0.314 
 
Map 
  Value SD ( ) t-Score p-Value 
 0.630 0.054   
 –0.005 0.077 –0.06 0.954 
 0.112 0.090 1.24 0.229 
 0.014 0.127 0.11 0.914 
 
Workload 
  Value SD ( ) t-Score p-Value 
 0.825 0.110   
 –0.067 0.156 –0.43 0.673 
 -0.200 0.182 –1.10 0.285 





  Value SD ( ) t- Score p- Value 
 0.571 0.080   
 0.026 0.114 0.23 0.824 
 –0.027 0.137 –0.20 0.843 

























  Value St. Dev ( ) t- Score p- Value 
 0.587 0.052   
 0.065 0.073 0.89 0.386 
 0.191 0.088 2.17 0.042 
 –0.112 0.125 -0.90 0.380 
 
Workload 
  Value St. Dev ( ) t- Score p- Value 
 0.823 0.118   
 –0.017 0.167 –0.10 0.922 
 –0.201 0.201 –1.00 0.329 





  Value St. Dev ( ) t- Score p- Value 
 0.481 0.090   
 0.210 0.127 1.65 0.115 
 0.000 0.000 0.87 0.393 
 0.000 0.000 –1.23 0.234 
 
Map 
  Value St. Dev ( ) t- Score p- Value 
 0.716 0.066   
 0.114 0.093 1.22 0.235 
 0.000 0.000 –0.37 0.712 
 0.000 0.000 –1.25 0.227 
 
Workload 
  Value St. Dev ( ) t- Score p- Value 
 0.825 0.149   
 –0.225 0.210 –1.07 0.298 
 0.000 0.000 –0.79 0.436 





























Effective Reading Rate 
 
SITREP 
  Value St. Dev ( ) t- Score p- Value 
 0.477 0.068   
 0.135 0.097 1.40 0.177 
 0.000 0.000 1.26 0.223 
 0.000 0.000 –0.83 0.414 
 
Map 
  Value St. Dev ( ) t- Score p- Value 
 0.759 0.050   
 0.012 0.071 0.18 0.863 
 0.000 0.000 –1.45 0.163 
 0.000 0.000 –0.14 0.891 
 
Workload 
  Value St. Dev ( ) t- Score p- Value 
 0.802 0.112   
 –0.331 0.158 –2.09 0.049 
 0.000 0.001 –0.87 0.396 
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